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Abstract 
The work described here represents an effort to understand and influence visual attention 
while solving physics problems containing a diagram. Our visual system is guided by two types 
of processes --  top-down and bottom-up.  The top-down processes are internal and determined 
by ones prior knowledge and goals. The bottom-up processes are external and determined by 
features of the visual stimuli such as color, and luminance contrast. When solving physics 
problems both top-down and bottom-up processes are active, but to varying degrees. The 
existence of two types of processes opens several interesting questions for physics education.  
For example, how do bottom-up processes influence problem solvers in physics? Can we 
leverage these processes to draw attention to relevant diagram areas and improve problem-
solving? In this dissertation we discuss three studies that investigate these open questions and 
rely on eye movements as a primary data source. We assume that eye movements reflect a 
person’s moment-to-moment cognitive processes, providing a window into one’s thinking. In our 
first study, we compared the way correct and incorrect solvers viewed relevant and novice-like 
elements in a physics problem diagram. We found correct solvers spent more time attending to 
relevant areas while incorrect solvers spent more time looking at novice-like areas. In our second 
study, we overlaid these problems with dynamic visual cues to help students’ redirect their 
attention. We found that in some cases these visual cues improved problem-solving performance 
and influenced visual attention. To determine more precisely how the perceptual salience of 
diagram elements influenced solvers’ attention, we conducted a third study where we 
manipulated the perceptual salience of the diagram elements via changes in luminance contrast. 
These changes did not influence participants’ answers or visual attention. Instead, similar to our 
first study, the time spent looking in various areas of the diagram was related to the correctness 
of an answer. These results suggest that top-down processes dominate while solving physics 
problems.  In sum, the study of visual attention and visual cueing in particular shows that 
attention is an important component of physics problem-solving and can potentially be leveraged 
to improve student performance. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction and Relevant Literature 
 Introduction 
Vision is a critically important medium of communication.  Students are continuously 
bombarded with images on television, cell phones and during instruction. In order to understand 
how people learn using graphics and images, one must consider perceptual processes and how 
our visual system works in addition to the cognitive processes involved in learning. Each 
moment, our visual system takes in a large amount of visual information, though we have a 
limited capacity to process this information (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Research has shown 
that although well-designed images can facilitate learning, poorly designed ones can increase 
cognitive load and reduce learning (Ayers & Paas, 2007). Therefore, it is important to study the 
way students learn with graphics and images. 
Little work on visual attention in physics problem solving has been conducted and we 
often overlook the unique role of the visual system in solving problems with multiple 
representations, though the use of multiple representations is ubiquitous in physics learning. Two 
sources of information guide visual attention, one external and the other internal, referred to as 
bottom-up and top-down information respectively. These are discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. When solving problems in physics, both top-down and bottom-up processes are active, 
but to varying degrees depending on a variety of factors such as the visual stimuli, task, prior 
knowledge etc. The existence of two different guides for our visual system opens a whole body 
of interesting questions we can ask about visual attention in physics problem solving. For 
example, perceptually salient bottom-up information in diagrams and images has been found to 
distract learners from other important and relevant features (Hegarty, Canham, & Fabrikant, 
2010; Lowe, 1999). Does this type of distraction occur in physics problem solving as well, or is 
visual attention in this type of problem solving primarily guided by top-down processes? Further, 
can we leverage bottom-up processes and use perceptually salient information in physics 
diagrams or animations to guide visual attention and improve physics problem solving? 
Additionally, does the way that bottom-up and top-down processes work together on visual 
attention vary with factors like ability in physics problem solving? These questions have not 
previously been explored in physics problem solving. In this dissertation, we discuss several 
studies which aim to answer these questions. All of the studies utilize eye movements as a main 
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source of data to measure visual attention. In this chapter we begin with a brief overview of eye 
movements and their relationship to cognitive processing. We will then discuss previous research 
on visual attention in physics, learning with multiple representations, a framework for insight 
problem solving, and the use of visual cues. Finally we will discuss the motivations for 
performing this research, our research questions and the organization of the thesis. 
 Relevant Literature 
 Eye Movements and Visual Attention 
As educational researchers, we are interested in understanding the processes involved in 
learning and problem solving. To understand these we would like to measure such processes in 
real time without interfering with the processes themselves. There are many ways to go about 
this, but each has a unique set of limitations. For example, we could collect written samples of 
students’ work which would give us insight into these processes, but much information is likely 
not captured on paper such as intermediate steps, divergent thought processes or affect. We could 
conduct well designed and executed interviews, though we recognize that any interactions with 
the interviewer or other students could influence the learning process. Think aloud interviews in 
particular address the real time aspect of understanding learning processes, but students must 
know what they think or feel in order to report it and also must discuss what really is rather than 
what they think should be. Further, they would ideally report all important information, as 
opposed to just a portion of their thoughts (Tuckman, 1994; Van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 
1994).  Further, an interviewer must be careful to accurately understand and portray participants 
meaning before making conclusions (Johnson & Christensen, 2008). While these research 
methodologies have advantages and disadvantages, recording eye movements is an alternate 
method which has been used widely in many disciplines to capture cognitive processes in real 
time (Charness, Reingold, Pomplun, & Stampe, 2001; Hegarty et al., 2010; Jarodzka, Scheiter, 
Gerjets, & van Gog, 2010; Rayner, 1998). With this method, a series of saccades (i.e., when eyes 
are in motion) and fixations (i.e., when eyes are stationary at a specific spatial location) are 
recorded with an eye tracker. The locations, durations and order of the saccades and fixations are 
then analyzed to understand the participants learning or problem solving process. The connection 
between eye movements and cognitive processing was articulated by Just and Carpenter as the 
“eye mind assumption” (1980). These researchers studied eye movements during reading and 
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explained that “the eye remains fixated on a word as long as the word is being processed. So the 
time it takes to process a newly fixated word is directly indicated by the gaze duration.” (Just & 
Carpenter, 1980) They proposed and tested a model for reading which included increased 
fixation durations for greater processing loads caused by accessing infrequent words, integrating 
information and making inferences. They found a good fit between their model and actual 
reading patterns. Their model assumes that one must fixate on a word to process it and that 
fixation duration is related to cognitive processing demands. Loftus and Mackworth (1978) 
studied the viewing of scenes and found that fixation durations were longer when participants 
viewed semantically informative areas of a scene.  Similar findings are presented in (De Graef, 
De Troy, & d'Ydewalle, 1992; Henderson, Weeks, & Hollingworth, 1999; Underwood, Jebbett, 
& Roberts, 2004). This work suggests that the location and duration of fixations is directly 
related to the locus and difficulty of cognitive processing. So eye movements may give us insight 
into what visual information is being thought about currently and how difficult this information 
is to process, a very promising measure for learning and problem solving processes. But we also 
offer some limitations regarding this connection between eye movements and cognitive 
processing.  
Our retina takes in a large amount of visual information in a single glance with the visual 
field produced by binocular vision containing an area of about 20,000 degrees squared  (Irwin, 
2004). Though we take in a large amount of visual information, we have a limited ability to 
perceive and process this information. This is because our brains can only process some of the 
information received by their retina at a given time (Desimone & Duncan, 1995) and we 
generally only become aware of that part of the retinal information that has been attended to and 
entered into working memory (Irwin & Gordon, 1998; Simons & Chabris, 1999; Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980). Further, there is only a small area of high visual acuity on our retina, called the 
fovea. Because of these limitations, we move our attention and eyes to different points in space 
in order to direct the fovea at specific visual information and select it for further processing. 
While we see the visual information most clearly at the center of gaze, where the fovea is, there 
exists a perceptual span around the foveal region from which information is also selected and 
processed (McConkie & Rayner, 1975).  Irwin explains, “the size of the functional field of view 
depends on the nature of the task, the number of items in the visual field and whether other 
cognitive demands are placed on the subjects.” (Irwin, 2004) Additionally, there are individual 
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differences in the size of the perceptual span: (Pringle, Irwin, Kramer, & Atchley, 2001) it can 
decrease with age (Scialfa, Thomas, & Joffe, 1994) or increase with expertise (Charness et al., 
2001). An eye tracker determines the eye position (fixation location) based on the location of the 
fovea, though this is not the only area from which visual information is extracted and processed. 
Visual information from the larger perceptual span is also used in cognitive processing.  
There are two types of visual attention: overt attention is associated with eye movements 
while covert attention is the act of mentally focusing ones attention at a point in space without 
moving the eyes (Hunt & Kingstone, 2003). These two types of attention are independent, but 
often move in tandem, with covert attention preceding overt eye movements to a new spatial 
location (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; Kowler, Anderson, 
Dosher, & Blaser, 1995). This means at some point during a fixation covert attention moves to 
the target location of the next saccade. It has been found that this shift in covert attention also 
means a shift in the locus of cognitive processing, where the information at the target location of 
the next saccade was in the locus of cognitive processing instead of the information in the center 
of the fovea. So, the loci of processing and eye position are temporarily dissociated right before 
every saccade (Irwin, 1992; Irwin & Andrews, 1996). This implies that for some portion of each 
fixation, covert attention and the associated cognitive processing are not aligned with the 
position of the fovea and instead are at the target position for the next saccade.  
So, the location of fixations does not conclusively indicate the information currently 
being processed, but eye movements do still give us approximate insight into cognitive 
processes. Unlike interviews or written responses, eye movements do not require the participant 
to reflect on their thought processes and then articulate them or to interact with an interviewer. 
Instead, we can remotely record eye movements, the precise location and durations of which 
participants are likely unaware, and relate these to participants’ real time cognitive processes, 
giving us a unique window into their thought processes. Eye movements as data do have their 
own limitations. For example, the use of an eye tracker often requires head stabilization, which 
can influence the participants’ state of mind. Further, the mere act of recording eye movements 
could cause a participant to view a stimulus differently. But with these in mind, we present three 
studies of visual attention in physics problem solving which rely on eye movement data to make 
conclusions about problem solving with physics problems containing diagrams.   
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 Top-down and Bottom-up Processes 
Our visual system is guided by two sources of information, called bottom-up and top-
down information. Bottom-up information is considered external and based on the physical 
features of visual stimuli such as color, orientation and luminance contrast. The visual processes 
that work on bottom-up information involve primitive brain areas early in the visual stream and 
tend to be very fast (Corbetta et al., 1998; Nobre et al., 2000).  The influence of bottom-up 
information on attention is generally explained in terms of the relative perceptual salience of 
elements of the visual stimuli (Carmi & Itti, 2006; Itti & Koch, 2000; Itti et al., 1998). 
Perceptually salient regions of an image tend to be those with relatively greater contrast in terms 
of luminance, color, orientation (e.g., of lines), or motion compared to the other image elements.  
Perceptually salient elements are believed to automatically capture attention through primitive 
visual mechanisms (Boehnke & Munoz, 2008; Kustov & Robinson, 1996). Computational 
models of perceptual salience have been developed (Itti & Koch, 2000; Itti et al., 1998) to 
produce a salience map of a scene or diagram, using visual feature contrasts of the type 
described above (i.e., luminance, color, orientation, motion).  Such salience maps have been 
found to predict significantly greater than chance where people will fixate their eyes as they view 
images (Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst & Neibur, 2003). Nevertheless, top-down factors, 
which we describe in more detail below, have been shown to have even larger effects on where 
people fixate in some circumstances (Einhauser et al., 2008; Foulsham & Underwood, 2007; 
Henderson et al., 2007).  Models of the effects of saliency on eye movements generally argue 
that the location with highest salience is selected for attention, this location is then fixated by the 
eyes, and after the information at that location has been sufficiently processed, one’s attention 
moves to the next most salient spatial location. Carmi and Itti (2006) studied the effects of 
saliency as a function of viewing time and found that their perceptual salience model best 
predicted the first six or seven fixations when viewing a scene (see also Parkhurst, Law and 
Niebur (2002)).  For the average viewer, this is equivalent to about the first two seconds of 
viewing.  This suggests that bottom-up processes are more dominant in the first two seconds of 
viewing, with top-down processes exerting a greater influence on eye movements thereafter.  
However, some researchers (Foulsham & Underwood, 2007) have found that perceptual 
saliency, as assessed by Itti’s model, did poorly in accounting for the paths that viewers’ eyes 
took when given a search task. For instance, in Hegarty, Canham and Fabrikant’s study (2010), 
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university students viewed weather maps and were tasked to determine wind direction. The 
researchers found no evidence to indicate that over the full trial period participants looked at the 
perceptually salient areas of the weather maps based on Itti’s algorithm. However, the 
researchers did not limit their analysis to only the first two seconds of viewing, when the effect 
of saliency driven bottom-up processes should be most pronounced.  
Visual attention is also influenced by top-down processes, which are considered internal 
and based on the viewer’s prior knowledge, task goals, and expectancies. Top-down effects on 
attention occur later in the time course of vision and tend to be mediated by higher brain areas 
(Sheinberg & Zelinsky, 1993; Van der Stigchel et al., 2006). Jarodzka et al. (2010) studied the 
visual attention of both novices and experts who viewed videos of unfamiliar fish swimming and 
classified the type of locomotion.  The authors found that experts spent significantly more time 
fixating on relevant areas of the video than biology students, who had the necessary background 
knowledge for differentiating types of locomotion but little practice in this classification task.  
The authors also found that novices spent more time than experts fixating on areas irrelevant for 
determining locomotion.  Similar studies have measured eye movements of experts when 
viewing art (Antes & Kristjanson, 1991) and playing chess (Charness et al., 2001), and have 
shown that the increased domain knowledge in these fields affects where people fixate while 
performing domain-relevant visual tasks. Thus, important differences in the eye movements of 
experts, who possess the necessary domain knowledge, versus novices, who do not possess such 
knowledge, can be seen by tracking their eye movements while they are carrying out domain-
relevant tasks (Rosengrant, Thomson, et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010; Tai et al., 2006). 
Researchers have found that the influence of top-down processes on the allocation of 
attention and eye movements vary with the nature of a task. For example, Underwood et al. 
(2006) found that participants viewing natural images fixated more on perceptually salient 
objects when asked to freely view the scene, but this effect was no longer observed when the 
participants’ were given a search task. This result has been replicated in other studies utilizing 
search tasks (Foulsham & Underwood, 2007; Underwood, Templeman, Lamming, & Foulsham, 
2008).  
The interaction between top-down and bottom-up processes is important to consider. A 
study by Lowe (1999) looked specifically at how the perceptual salience of elements in the 
visual stimuli and the level of domain knowledge interacted. He found that the written responses 
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of low domain knowledge meteorology students who studied animated weather maps and 
recorded generalizations about them primarily contained information extracted from perceptually 
salient areas of the weather maps.  Hegarty Canham, and Fabrikant (2010) also investigated how 
perceptual salience influenced visual attention in the context of weather maps and showed an 
interesting interaction between bottom-up salience and top-down knowledge in the allocation of 
overt visual attention. The authors recorded participants’ eye movements while viewing static 
weather maps in which the relative salience of task-relevant and task-irrelevant information had 
been manipulated. They showed that before instruction, participants spent more time attending to 
task-irrelevant areas when they were the most perceptually salient elements on the map. 
However, after instruction, there was no difference in the time spent attending to task-irrelevant 
information regardless of its perceptually salience. Thus, while both of these studies show that 
novice learners are strongly influenced by areas of a diagram that are perceptually salient, the 
study by Hegarty, Canham and Fabrikant showed domain knowledge decreased the influence of 
perceptual salience on overt, visual attention processes (i.e., where learners looked). 
Influence of Top-down and Bottom-up Processes in Physics Problem Solving 
In physics education, a consistent pattern of wrong answers to many simple conceptual 
questions has been found (Heckler, 2011). There are several ways to describe the reason(s) that 
students answer these questions incorrectly, and these explanations differ in the way top-down or 
bottom-up processes are cited as contributors. For example, one perspective is that our everyday 
interactions with the physical world help us develop ideas about how it works without any 
formal instruction (Halloun & Hestenes, 1985; McDermott & Redish, 1999). These ideas can 
become deep-seated stable cognitive structures, called misconceptions, that interfere with the 
acquisition of scientifically accurate understanding (Docktor & Mestre, 2011). Other research 
suggests that these wrong answer patterns are a result of misapplication of conceptual resources 
(Hammer, 2000). These are small pieces of knowledge that a learner may activate alone or in 
clusters depending on context. Incorrect answers to physics questions occur when inappropriate 
resources or clusters of resources are applied to a given situation.  Other research posits that 
students systematically answer problems incorrectly because they miscategorize knowledge into 
inappropriate ontological categories, for example thinking of force as a thing instead of an 
interaction (Chi, 1992). All of these above mentioned explanations for students’ reasoning 
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patterns are cognitive and top-down in nature. In other words, it is the knowledge that students 
possess and the ways in which they use this knowledge that results in their incorrect answers.  
Heckler (2011) has suggested an intriguing alternative conjecture for why students 
consistently answer simple physics questions incorrectly that is bottom-up in nature. Instead of 
being primarily concerned with students’ knowledge, he suggested that processes inherent to our 
visual system might be contributing to systematically incorrect answers. Heckler explains: 
 I would like to consider the hypothesis that many students may simply base their 
response on the most salient and plausibly relevant features of a science question, even if 
these salient features may in fact be unrelated or contrary to the relevant scientific 
concept. With several competing features, the most salient one tends to automatically 
capture attention, with little opportunity for alternative less salient features to be 
considered. (pg. 251)  
So, bottom-up processes inherent in students’ visual system automatically direct their 
attention to the most perceptually salient problem elements. Then, as long as the elements 
suggest a plausible and relevant answer, students’ base their answer choices on them. This occurs 
even if these elements suggest an answer choice that is contrary to the scientifically correct 
answer, as students have not considered other less salient elements. Heckler provided evidence 
for his explanation in the form of student response patterns to a set of similar questions in which 
areas in the problem diagram relevant to the incorrect answer were presumed to have high levels 
of salience, but he pointed out that eye tracking is needed to observe the allocation of attention 
and confirm his conjecture.  
The relationship between top-down and bottom-up processes in physics problem solving 
will be further investigated in the research described in chapters 3 and 5. 
 Research on Visual Attention in Physics Education 
Studies exploring cognitive processes related to physics learning or problem solving via 
visual attention are not common in the field of physics education research (PER), though a small 
set of studies have been conducted and offer interesting findings. Below we discuss work in PER 
that deals with differences in attention based on expertise, attention to relevant features, global 
versus local attention and attention to conceptual text and mathematical steps. This work is 
presented in chronological order.  
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Tai, Loehr and Brigham (2006) investigated differences in visual attention between six 
pre-service science teachers who varied by their ability, familiarity and confidence in chemistry, 
biology and physics. Their eye movements were recorded on multiple-choice questions from 
Virginia Standards of Learning exams in biology and chemistry and New York Regent exams in 
physics. They found that the higher expertise a subject had in a given domain, the fewer fixations 
in pre-defined zones (such as question zone, image zone, answer zone) and the fewer saccades 
between zones. This suggests that students with higher expertise can hold important pieces of 
information in working memory and coordinate those with other important features without 
looking back at previously attended zones. This work was done with only six subjects, so 
conclusions remain tentative. Rosengrant, Thomas and Mzoughi (2009) studied how nine 
introductory algebra based physics students (novices) and two experts in physics solved four 
problems containing circuit diagrams which increased in difficulty. They found experts often 
shifted their attention from their own written work to the circuit diagram provided, likely 
integrating their own solution and the circuit diagram. Novices did not show this type of 
integration. Experts exhibited more global attention, focusing on the whole circuit and path of 
the current. Novices tended to look at individual resistor components and those that could be 
combined with series/parallel rules for resistors. This work indicates there are important 
differences between physics students and experts when solving problems with circuit diagrams. 
Smith, Mestre and Ross (2010) investigated the visual attention of calculus based introductory 
physics students as they read worked examples containing conceptual textual explanations and 
related equations. They found that students spent a large (about 40%) portion of time reading the 
conceptual textual explanations and made frequent transitions between the equations and text. 
Interestingly, performance on conceptual post-test questions indicates low retention of the 
conceptual information students read. The authors suggest that this may be due to the fact that 
often conceptual information is not assessed in physics problem solving, that participants may 
not understand the role of conceptual information in problem solving or that the text was not 
used by the students to gain conceptual insight. Feil and Mestre (2010) investigated whether 
physics graduate students (experts) and introductory algebra and calculus based physics student 
(novices) could detect small changes to physics problems containing blocks and ramps or blocks 
and pulleys using a change blindness paradigm. They found that experts were more likely to 
notice a change if it altered the underlying physics of the situation. Novices who had stronger 
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relevant content knowledge were also more likely to notice physics-modifying changes. Neither 
experts nor novices were likely to notice changes to surface features of the problems. This 
suggests that experts and those with strong physics understanding attend to diagram features that 
are important to understanding the physics in a diagram. Rosengrant, Hearrington, Alvarado and 
Keeble (2011) studied students attention during the lecture for a physical science course for 
elementary teachers. Eight students from the course volunteered to wear eye-tracking glasses for 
the duration of a lecture. They found students spent very little time attending to the professor and 
instead directed their attention to PowerPoint slides or their notes unless the professor was very 
animated, drew on the board or offered examples in addition to those on the PowerPoint slides. 
This implies that if a professor wanted students to attend to him/her, they should not also provide 
another distracter such as a PowerPoint slide. They also found that students located in the middle 
and front of the classroom tended to be more on task than those in other areas. This is 
preliminary work which expands beyond studying attentional processes while problem solving, 
learning individually or completing an assessment, to look at attention while learning physics in 
a classroom environment.  
More recently, Docktor, Mestre, Gire and Rebello (2012) looked at how graduate physics 
students and introductory algebra based physics students differed in the way they viewed and 
interpreted kinematics graphs. The participants were tasked with selecting the region of the graph 
which matched a text description.  The congruence between the text description and the shape of 
the graph was varied (e.g. the text stated the velocity was increasing and the corresponding 
region in the displacement vs. time had a negative slope) as well as whether the text represented 
a direct, derivative or integral quantity. They found that the performance of experts was higher 
than novices on incongruent items, though they did not find any difference in their eye 
movements. Experts looked at distracters, but were not fooled by them. In a related piece of 
work, Gire, Docktor, Rebello and Mestre (2012) investigated representational fluency of experts 
and novices in physics. Participants were presented with pairs of a graph, equation or text, and 
would indicate if the representations were consistent with each other. Experts were significantly 
more likely to indicate consistency correctly, indicating greater representational fluency than 
novices. Experts also spent less time fixating on equations and text. This implies that experts 
required less processing time for the information represented with equations and text, as they 
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were more familiar with this information. It is curious that the same difference was not found on 
the graphical representation. 
So, the work on visual attention in physics education has been increasing over the last 
several years with most studies focusing on differences between experts and novices and finding 
that various differences do exist between these groups. This is similar to the work presented in 
Chapter 3, though instead of looking at expertise based on experience in physics, we instead 
looked at differences between problem solvers based on correctness of solution. There have also 
been some interesting studies looking at how students learn by, for example, reading worked 
solutions, or how their visual attention proceeds through a lecture. The work presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5 is not similar to any of these previous studies in PER.  
 Multiple Representations and Multimedia Learning 
The physics problems studied in this dissertation all contain text and a diagram or graph, 
making previous research on problem solving with multiple representations applicable to our 
work. We will briefly describe work done on multiple representations within PER as well as a 
theoretical model of multimedia learning relevant to our work. 
Physics problem solving lends itself to the use of multiple representations to visualize 
problem scenarios, relationships between quantities, and express mathematical relationships. It 
has been found that the use and format of representations is related to performance on physics 
problems. Rosengrant, Heuvelen and Etkina (2009) found that students who drew free body 
diagrams to solve exam problems were more successful at answering the exam problems 
correctly. In this case, using a diagram while solving problems was helpful. Meltzer (2005) 
studied student performance on two very similar Newton’s Third Law problems and found that 
the proportion of correct answers on the verbal question was higher, suggesting that students 
interpreted the different representations differently. Kohl and Finkelstein (2005) also found 
differences in performance for introductory physics students on isomorphic homework and quiz 
problems presented with either a mathematical, pictorial, graphical or verbal representation of 
the situation. Their data suggest that differences depend on prior knowledge, expectations and 
the particular contextual features of the problem and representation. The dependence on 
contextual features is of particular interest to us, as we investigated visual attention on problems 
with diagrams and graphs, which has given us insight into the particulars of the contextual 
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dependence. Ibrahim and Rebello (2012) studied the strategies engineering students employed 
when solving problems from kinematics and work which were represented in graphical, textual 
and mathematical formats. The authors found that the representational format, prior knowledge 
and familiarity with the given topic influenced the students’ problem solving approaches, but the 
authors did not cite the features of the representation as an important factor. This previous work 
motivates the study of students’ visual attention when solving physics problems with multiple 
representations to determine precisely how the problems are viewed and interpreted to bring 
about these performance differences. 
There has also been much work done on the use of multiple representations outside of 
physics. Through this work, Mayer has developed the Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning 
to describe the process of learning with words (written or spoken) and pictures (diagrams, 
graphs, animations, videos etc.) The problems discussed in this dissertation all include words and 
pictures, making this theory relevant to the work. A key tenet is the multimedia principle which 
states that under certain circumstances people learn more deeply from words and pictures than 
from words alone (Mayer, 2001). This tenant is informed by the way the human mind works. 
Mayer describes three assumptions about how the human mind works. First, the dual channel 
assumption states that the human mind contains two separate channels for processing 
visual/pictorial and auditory/verbal information. He goes on to specify two additional processing 
channels which he calls “approaches”. These are the sensory modality approach, which 
distinguish between visually and auditorily presented information, and the presentation-mode 
approach, which distinguishes between stimuli presented in verbal form (written or spoken text) 
and non-verbal form (pictures, animation, sounds). Next, the limited capacity assumption asserts 
that each of these channels can only process a certain amount of information in working memory 
at a given time, approximately five to seven chunks.  This implies that there is competition for 
attention between different pieces of incoming information. Finally, the active processing 
assumption states that humans actively create a mental representation of their experiences by 
attending to or selecting relevant information, organizing this information to make it coherent 
and integrating the information with their existing knowledge base. More specifically, selecting 
relevant information means choosing information from the environment and bringing it into 
working memory. Mayer cites examples of organization such as providing structure to the 
selected information in the form of process, comparison, generalization, enumeration and 
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classification structures. Integration involves activating prior knowledge from long-term memory 
and bringing it into working memory to be combined with new information. Figure 1.1 presents 
a step-by-step diagram of Mayer’s Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning. The first step in 
multimedia learning is for the multimedia information to enter sensory memory where an exact 
visual or auditory image is held for a very brief amount of time before selected relevant words 
and images enter working memory. The selected words and images enter working memory in 
separate channels where a mental representation of each is formed. These mental representations 
of sounds and images can interact, as shown by the back and forth arrows connecting these in 
Figure 1.1. This occurs for example by visualizing a spoken word, or internally verbalizing a 
written word. The sounds and images are then organized to make the representation coherent and 
at this point the knowledge structures are referred to as verbal or pictorial models. Now, 
integration occurs which involves mapping relationships among related elements in the verbal 
and pictorial models and combining the separate models into a single integrated mental 
representation. Prior knowledge from long-term memory also informs this newly integrated 
representation.  
Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of Mayer’s Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning 
(Mayer, 2001). 
 
  
This theory of multimedia learning is most relevant to the work described in Chapter 4 on 
visual cueing. Based on Mayer’s Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning, de Koning, Tabbers, 
Rikers and Paas (2009) proposed a framework for attention cueing consisting of three functions 
of visual cues: 1) selection of relevant information, 2) organization of information into a 
coherent structure and 3) integration within and across representations (referred to as the SOI 
framework). Since their framework deals with visual cues, they primarily discuss multimedia 
presented as words or pictures in animations (and not information presented auditorily). Because 
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there is competition between which visual information is selected, visual cues are helpful 
because they can draw attention to relevant areas to help students’ select the important 
information and ignore the irrelevant. Further, knowing that perceptually salient bottom-up 
information can automatically capture attention, selection cues should be designed to have high 
perceptual salience.  An example is spotlighting a relevant sub-system of the heart when viewing 
an animation of the cardiovascular system. In line with the limited capacity assumption, it is 
important to assure ones limited cognitive resources are spent organizing and integrating 
important information. Organization cues assist learners in emphasizing and extracting the 
structure of the information, for example headings or outlines of a text help learners with text 
comprehension. Finally, integration cues can help relate elements within a single representation, 
for example, using arrows or lines to make a temporal relationship more explicit, or relate 
elements between representations. An example of this is integrating related information from text 
and a diagram. Two kinds of integration processes are important for multimedia learning and 
problem solving:  Integrating elements (i) within a single representation that are widely spatially 
separated (Lowe, 1989) or (ii) across multiple representations or modalities such as  coordinating 
graphs and pictures with text to create an operational situational mental model (Johnson-Laird, 
1983) to solve the problem.  Cueing learners to relate elements within a single representation is 
especially important if the elements they need to integrate are widely spatially separated (Lowe, 
1989) or when the problem is complex and could have more than one method for solution and 
schema construction, imposing a high cognitive load on the learner.  Cues that make implicit 
causal or functional relations between elements more explicit can potentially improve learning. 
Integration cues can be particularly helpful for learners when they must integrate textual and 
graphical information to create a situation model in order to solve a math or science problem 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
The SOI framework is used in our work on visual cueing described in Chapter 4. Many 
studies using selection, organization and integration visual cues have been conducted and are 
described below. 
 Attentional Cueing 
Following from the SOI framework for visual cues described above, it may be that visual 
cues or signals can facilitate meaningful understanding or productive problem solving (Mautone 
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& Mayer, 2001; Ozcelik, Arslan-Asi, & Cagiltay, 2010). Visual cues (also called signals) were 
first used to aid in text comprehension by making the structure of the text more obvious. These 
types of signals include highlighting, underlining, headings, summaries, pointer works (e.g. first, 
second, third) and outlines and have been found effective at helping readers organize textual 
information (Loman & Mayer, 1983; Lorch & Lorch, 1996; Meyer, 1975; Rickards, Fajen, 
Sullivan, & Gillespie, 1997). Visual cues and signals have also been studied in multimedia 
environments in a wide range of disciplines. These cues varied by their function, type of 
visualization used, as well as their effect on comprehension and transfer. A variety of these 
studies are summarized below to give the reader a sense of the diversity of work done with 
attentional cueing and the effectiveness of visual cues. We present our work on visual cueing in 
Chapter 4. 
We first discuss previous research where visual cues were used with static images and 
text or verbal explanations. Visual cues have been used to help students integrate information 
from these different modalities and representations. Scheiter and Eitel (2010) investigated how 
university students learned about the heart with text and a diagram. Important words were 
highlighted in the text and labeled the diagram, color-coding and deictic references were used 
(words or sentences that specify the referent in the diagram). They found that these signals 
improved understanding of the relationship between text and diagram and increased visual 
attention to the diagram. Kalyuga et al. (1999) studied a textual and diagrammatic representation 
of a “push button” circuit in which information from the text and diagram had to be integrated to 
understand the operation of the circuit. Color-coding was used to relate elements of the text and 
diagram for a group of first year trade school students. They found that participants who saw 
color-coding had higher comprehension scores. Similarly, Tabbers, Martens and Merrienboer 
(2004) studied the use of visual cues overlaid on diagrams in a lesson on instructional design. 
Education students viewed a set of slides with text accompanied by diagrams from which 
elements were highlighted in red when the student clicked on the related text. They found higher 
retention scores for those who saw the colored cues. Jamet, Gavota, and Quaireau (2008) 
investigated how visual cues could increase comprehension and transfer when spoken 
explanation and labeled diagrams of the brain were presented to students. When an area of the 
brain was mentioned in the spoken explanation, it was colored red in the diagram. The 
researchers found that those who saw the visual cues had higher scores on retention questions but 
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no difference was found on transfer questions. So visual cues can help students integrate and 
retain information from text or spoken explanations and a static diagram.  
Visual cues have also been used to assist solvers with puzzle and insight problems. 
Improved problem solving performance was found on a picture puzzle (picture cut up into pieces 
and pieces scrambled) when an expert solver’s real time eye movements were shown to a novice 
(Velichkovsky, 1995). Grant and Spivey (2003) studied the effectiveness of visual cues on one 
particular insight problem called Duncker’s radiation problem (Duncker, 1945). The researchers 
manipulated the diagram so that either the relevant or irrelevant area of the diagram pulsed or the 
diagram remained static. They found that those who viewed the relevant area pulsing (expanding 
by six pixels repeatedly) spent more time looking at the relevant area and were significantly 
more likely to produce a correct solution than those who saw the irrelevant area pulsing or a 
static diagram. They suggest that drawing attention to the critical area of a diagram can induce 
correct solving of an insight problem and the location of visual attention may influence cognitive 
processing. Thomas and Lleras (2007) conducted a follow-up study on Grant and Spivey’s work 
(2003) to determine the existence and nature of an implicit connection between eye movements 
and cognition. To do this, they overlaid visual cues on the Dunker’s radiation problem diagram 
for four seconds at the end of a 26 second free viewing period. This was repeated 20 times or 
until the participant answered correctly. These visual cues moved in four different patterns, one 
of which embodied the solution to the problem. Participants in the embodied solution group were 
significantly more likely to solve the problem correctly. The authors concluded that manipulating 
eye movements can serve as an implicit guide to influence thinking on spatial reasoning tasks. 
Thomas and Lleras (2009) conducted another study to determine if this effect was a result of 
shifts in attention or actual eye movements. The “eye-movement” group saw random digits 
appear in a pattern that embodied the solution and followed these digits with their eyes. The 
“attention-shift” group saw the same string of random digits as the eye-movement group, but was 
instructed to follow the digits with their attention and keep their eyes fixated at the center of the 
screen. The eye-movement and attention-shift groups were more likely than other groups to 
answer the problem correctly, though no significant difference was found between them. The 
results of this study suggest that the primary mechanism behind the increased correct solution 
rates in Thomas and Lleras’ study (2007) for the embodied solution group is the shift of attention 
that immediately preceded the directed eye movements. Thus, directed shifts of attention have 
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been found to influence cognitive processing on spatial insight problems and increase rates of 
correct solutions. This work by Grant and Spivey (2003) and Thomas and Lleras (2007) had a 
strong influence in the design of our study on visual cueing described in Chapter 4. 
On the other hand, van Gog, Jardozka, Scheiter, Gerjets and Paas (2009) investigated 
how showing students the eye movements of experts could improve their problem solving ability 
on a problem solving task called “Frog Leap.” They found that seeing the expert eye movements 
did not increase problem solving ability. The authors suggest that developing cues based on the 
expert eye movements and not using the eye movements directly may have been more useful. So, 
in some cases visual cues which embody a solution or mimic expert eye movements can improve 
problem solving performance on puzzles and insight problems.  
Visual cueing has been more recently studied in instructional animations and mixed 
effects on comprehension and transfer have been found. Mautone and Mayer (2001) used colored 
arrows in a narrated animation explaining how planes achieve lift to guide learner’s attention to 
relevant aspects of the animations. Additionally, they used colors to make explicit organization 
and relationships among components and summary icons to make the structure of the 
presentation more explicit. They did not find that these signals positively influenced retention or 
transfer. They suggest that signaling was not strong enough to be effective or this animation did 
not require signals.  Mautone and Mayer (2007) also studied signaling with geography graphs, 
but in this study the signaled group saw a series of illustrations of actual rivers, river banks, boats 
collecting samples etc. in addition to the geography graphs which described physical situations. 
The authors also added visual signals to the graphs themselves by animating the order and speed 
in which graph elements were shown and adding colored shading and lines to the graphs. They 
found that those who viewed the graphs with the added illustrations and signals produced more 
relational statements but not more causal statements about the material at hand. Kriz and Hegarty 
(2007) studied the effect of signaling on comprehension of a computer animation of a flushing 
cistern. The signals used were arrows pointing at relevant elements during each step of the 
flushing process. They found no difference for the step-by-step descriptions of the system, or 
function and troubleshooting questions for those who saw the signals and those who did not. So, 
the arrow signals that accompanied the steps of the flushing cistern did not seem to help students 
better understand this real world system. de Koning, Tabbers, Rikers and Paas (2007) looked at 
how spotlight cueing on an complex animation of the cardiovascular system influenced 
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comprehension and transfer. The spotlight cues were produced by slightly darkening all parts of 
the animation except the section being cued. They found participants in the cued condition were 
significantly more likely to answer comprehension questions about the cued system as well as 
other systems and transfer questions correctly. The results of this study show that visually cueing 
an important region in an animation can increase comprehension and transfer for that region as 
well as the other regions of the animation. de Koning, Tabbers, Rikers and Paas (2010) 
conducted a follow up study to gain more information about the cognitive processing of those 
viewing an animation of the cardiovascular system with spotlight visual cues and to test the 
effect of cueing multiple subsystems (as compared to a single subsystem looked at previously). 
They included a single cue condition (identical to their previous study), a multiple cue condition 
and no cue condition. Participants provided cued verbal retrospective reports of their thinking 
after studying the animation. The authors did not find the same positive effect of the cues on the 
comprehension or transfer test for the single cue condition and also found no positive effects on 
these measures for the multiple cue condition. They suspect that positioning the retrospective 
report before the learning tests may have influenced the null result. It was also found that cueing 
did affect that allocation of attention, as cued areas were fixated longer and more frequently than 
un-cued. The verbal reports revealed that the single and multiple cued group made statements 
about the cued subsystem more often than those in the no cue condition. Thus, the authors 
conclude that visual cues primarily influence perceptual processing and have less influence on 
cognitive processing when viewing animations. Boucheix and Lowe (2010) looked at how 
different visual cue types and synchronization of these cues affected attention and 
comprehension of an animated of a piano system. The experiment included an arrow cue 
condition, spreading color cue condition and a no cue condition. They found that the spreading 
cue condition had significantly higher comprehension scores than the arrow-cue condition, 
though no difference was found between the arrow-cue condition and the no-cue condition. They 
also found that the areas most relevant for understanding the piano system’s functions were 
fixated on for longer times in the spreading color cue condition. In experiment 2, the authors 
investigated the effect of synchronization of the cues on comprehension and transfer. A 
synchronized cue is one that appears progressively as a result of user control. It was found that 
those in the synchronized spreading color cue condition had higher comprehension scores on a 
subset of the test and exhibited more fixations in the highly relevant but not perceptually salient 
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areas of the piano system.  In conclusion, these experiments show that spreading color cues can 
be effective at redirecting learners’ attention to relevant, but not necessarily perceptually salient, 
areas of the piano system and this leads to higher comprehension. Further, synchronizing these 
cues with the user-controls instead of showing them all at once is also useful.  
This is not a complete description of all studies using cues, but is meant to give the reader 
a sense of the types of cues and contexts that have been previously studied. Additional cueing 
studies include (Boucheix & Guignard, 2005; Craig, Gholson, & Driscoll, 2002; Fischer, Lowe, 
& Schwan, 2008; Huk & Steinke, 2007; Jeung, Chandler, & Sweller, 1997 ; Large, Beheshti, 
Breuleux, & Renaud, 1998; Oostendorp & Beijersbergen, 2007; Ozcelik et al., 2010; Seufert & 
Brünken, 2006; Tversky, Heiser, Mackenzie, Lozano, & Morrison, 2008). 
In summary, many different cue types have been used with text, static images and 
instructional animations with varying levels of complexity, different subject matter and varying 
outcomes. Factors such as the time the cue is shown, the type of cue (highlighting, arrow, 
spotlight, spreading color), whether the cue embodies the solution or is based on expert eye 
movements, user control in viewing the cue, how much extra information the cue adds, whether 
the cue was explicitly meant to be helpful or not and the purpose of the cue (e.g. to select 
relevant information, make connections etc.) were varied in these studies and produced different 
learning outcomes.  
 Representational Change Theory 
In our work on visual cueing described in Chapter 4, we used Representational Change 
Theory (Ohlsson, 1992) to help us understand how visual cues could improve students’ 
performance on conceptual physics questions. Representational Change Theory provides a 
framework to understand the cognitive mechanism of solving problems – particularly problems 
that need insight, as opposed to merely algorithmic problems. This theory is relevant to our work 
on visual cues, as the problems we used required conceptual insight and are not algorithmic in 
nature.  
Representational Change Theory explains that the way a problem is represented in a 
solver’s mind mediates the knowledge that the solver retrieves from long-term memory. The 
retrieval process is based on spreading activation among concepts or pieces of knowledge in 
long-term memory. An impasse or block occurs when the way a problem is represented does not 
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permit retrieval of necessary operators or possible actions. Breaking the impasse requires 
changing the problem representation. A new mental representation acts as a retrieval cue for 
relevant operators in long-term memory, extending the information available to the problem 
solver. Changing the mental representation can occur through elaboration, namely adding more 
problem information, or re-encoding, that is reinterpreting some aspect of the problem 
representation. Insight is achieved when the impasse is broken and the retrieved knowledge 
operators are sufficient to solve the problem. 
According to representational change theory there are three mechanisms by which an 
impasse to solving a problem is broken: (i) adding information to the problem to enrich and 
extend the existing representation (i.e. elaboration); (ii) replacing the existing representation with 
a different more productive representation (i.e. re-encoding); or (iii) removing unnecessary 
constraints often self-imposed by the problem solver (i.e. constraint relaxation). Once the 
impasse is broken, the new mental representation of the problem can activate relevant concepts 
in long-term memory, extending the information available to the problem solver. When the 
relevant concept or pieces of knowledge are available to the solver, she can apply the concept to 
answer the question correctly. 
 Motivation 
The studies presented in this dissertation were motivated by previous research in 
cognitive psychology and emerging work in physics education research on visual attention and 
problem solving. Much insight into student thinking has been gained by studying attention and 
eye movements in both of these fields, though this work has just recently begun in physics 
education.  Visual attention can and has given us real time insight into cognitive processes that 
occur during physics problem solving, and eye tracking offers an exciting new tool to access 
what students are looking at and thinking about. For each separate research question addressed, 
we were motivated by studies which raised additional questions in our minds. For example, as 
described above, Rosengrant et al. (2009) investigated the visual attention of expert and novices 
in physics when solving circuit problems and found some interesting differences, but their study 
involved very few subjects and was limited to one type of problem. We were curious if these 
differences in visual attention occurred in commonly used introductory physics problems for 
which there is a consistent wrong answer given (these types of problems are commonly studied 
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in misconceptions literature, for example, (McDermott, Rosenquist, & van Zee, 1987; 
Trowbridge & McDermott, 1980)). We were also curious if these differences in visual attention 
were influenced more strongly by top-down or bottom-up processes. This motivated Research 
Question 1.  
Next, we wanted to know if we could use visual cues to influence how students thought 
about physics problems. Visual cues overlaid on problem diagrams and animations have been 
used extensively to help students focus on relevant information and relate information within and 
between representations (de Koning, Tabbers, Rikers, & Paas, 2009), as described above. 
Research Question 2 was particularly motivated by related studies of Dunckers radiation problem 
(Duncker, 1945) that utilized visual cues to draw participants’ attention to relevant diagram areas 
in a pattern which embodied the solution to the problem (Grant & Spivey, 2003; Thomas & 
Lleras, 2007, 2009). The authors concluded that manipulating eye movements could serve as an 
implicit guide to influence thinking on spatial reasoning tasks. We hoped that we could find the 
same effect of implicit visual cues for physics problems.  
Finally, Research Question 3 was motivated by work by Heckler (2011) (also described 
above) who proposed the intriguing alternate conjecture for why students consistently answer 
simple physics questions correctly which is based on the influence of bottom-up perceptual 
processes. We wanted to test his conjecture using eye tracking to determine if this bottom-up 
information was distracting students while solving physics problems and leading to incorrect 
answers. If it were true that perceptual salience guides students attention and reasoning on 
physics problems, the way the diagrams are designed could be altered and in turn problem-
solving performance could presumably be improved.   
 Research Questions 
Beyond the overarching question of exploring the role of visual attention in physics 
problem solving, we want to answer three specific research questions. These are as follows: 
1. Does visual attention differ between those who correctly and incorrectly answer physics 
problems which contain relevant information in a diagram? 
• Are these differences in visual attention related to top-down cognitive processes or 
bottom-up perceptual processes? 
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2. Can short duration dynamic selection/integration visual cues influence students’ 
reasoning and answers on physics questions with a diagram? 
• Does seeing these cues repeatedly on similar problems influence students’ reasoning 
and answer choices on transfer problems? 
• Does seeing these cues influence visual attention while the cues are shown as well as 
on transfer problems? 
3. Does perceptual salience of diagram elements influence students’ answer choices and eye 
movements on physics problems which contain the relevant information in a diagram? 
• If perceptual salience does influence visual attention and answer choices, how should 
we account for this when creating instructional materials containing diagrams or 
animations? 
 Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation covers work from three different studies of visual attention and problem 
solving in physics. The first study is described in Chapter 3 titled ‘Differences in Visual 
Attention Between Correct and Incorrect Problem Solvers.’ This study was conducted in the 
Spring of 2010 to determine if the way students answer physics questions with a diagram is 
related to where they look in the diagram. We found differences in visual attention based on 
correctness. This finding motivated two additional studies which are described in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5. The work in Chapter 4 titled ‘Can Short Duration Visual Cues Influence Students’ 
Reasoning and Eye Movements in Physics Problems?’ and completed in the Spring and Fall of 
2011 is directly motivated by the findings described in Chapter 3, namely, those who answer 
incorrectly spend more time looking at distracting novice-like areas of a physics diagram. The 
work described in Chapter 4 attempts to use dynamic visual cues to draw students’ attention 
away from these novice-like areas and to relevant areas of the problem diagrams and in turn help 
them reason about and answer the problems correctly. The work in Chapter 5 titled ‘Do 
Perceptually Salient Elements in Physics Problems Influence Students’ Eye Movements and 
Answers?” is motivated by questions left open at the conclusion of the study described in 
Chapter 3. In that study, we hoped to determine which processes were primarily influencing 
visual attention, top-down or bottom-up. Results suggested that bottom-up processes may play a 
role in attention allocation on these physics diagrams but several limitations prevented firm 
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conclusions. The work described in Chapter 5 addresses these limitations and builds on the prior 
work with a more rigorous design to specifically determine how perceptual salience influences 
students’ visual attention and answer choices. In summary, we suggest beginning the reading of 
this dissertation with Chapter 3 and then Chapters 4 and 5 in any order. A summary of the 
dissertation is shown in Figure 1.2.  
 
Figure 1.2 Dissertation reading guide.  
!
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Chapter 2 - Eye Tracking Methods 
 Eye Tracking Technology 
In all three studies eye movements were recorded with an EyeLink 1000 desktop 
mounted eye-tracking system (http://www.sr-research.com), which is accurate to less than 0.50° 
of visual angle. Participants were presented with physics problems on a computer screen viewed 
at a distance of 24 inches using a chin and forehead rest to minimize participants’ extraneous 
head movements. The eye tracker, chin rest and computer monitor are pictured in Figure 2.1. The 
resolution of the computer screen was set to 1024 x 768 pixels with a refresh rate of 85 Hz. Each 
physics problem subtended 33.3° x 25.5° of visual angle. An eye movement was classified as a 
saccade (i.e., in motion) if the eye’s acceleration exceeded 8,500°/s2 and the velocity exceeded 
30°/s.  Otherwise, the eye was considered to be in a fixation (i.e., stationary at a specific spatial 
location). A nine-point calibration and validation procedure was used at the beginning of the 
experiment. 
  
Figure 2.1 Participant viewing computer screen with head in chin rest and eye movements 
being recorded with Eye Link 1000 desktop eye tracker.  
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 Area of Interest Analysis 
An “area of interest” (AOI) analysis was used in all three studies described in this 
dissertation. In this analysis of eye movements, areas of the physics diagrams were specified, for 
example, the area relevant to the correct answer or the most perceptually salient area. These 
areas were determined a priori based on the research questions guiding the study. Then, the 
amount of time (fixation time) each participant spent in each AOI was determined from the eye 
movement record. Finally, the time spent in each AOI was transformed into some other useful 
metric, such as percentage of total time viewing the diagram, and this new metric was compared 
between or within treatment groups, depending on the research design and questions. 
 Scan Path Analysis 
A scan path is the series of fixations and saccades the eyes make over time. A scan path 
analysis is one where scan paths are compared pair wise to determine how similar they are. This 
method includes both temporal and spatial information and requires no decisions to be made 
about the data a priori, for example, one does not have to define AOIs based on an 
experimenter’s definition or rating. Therefore, it is possible that differences exist in sets of eye 
movement data that are not detected by looking at fixation durations in AOIs. 
In the studies described in Chapters 4 and 5, we used ScanMatch, (Cristino et al., 2010) 
which is an algorithm that compares two scan paths at a time and computes a number which 
represents their similarity in space and time. It is based on the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm 
used to compare DNA sequences. This algorithm overlays a labeled grid on to the image of 
interest and recodes the ordered locations and durations of fixations into a sequence of letters. 
Longer fixations result in repeated letters in the sequence (Figure 2.1). The letter sequences of 
two sets of eye movements are then compared to each other to calculate a similarity score. 
Letters nearer to each other in the grid receive a higher score than those farther apart. The 
similarity score is normalized so that a score near one represents two sequences of eye 
movements that are very similar spatially and temporally. The similarity scores are then 
compared according to the research questions being investigated.  
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Figure 2.2 Example of ScanMatch algorithm converting scan path into letter sequence used 
to calculate similarity score. Red circles represent fixations, red arrows represent saccades. 
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Chapter 3 - Differences in Visual Attention Between Correct and 
Incorrect Problem Solvers1 
 Introduction 
Many physics problems contain diagrams and often these diagrams contain information 
that is both relevant to the solution of the problem and information that is irrelevant.  Students 
commonly use this irrelevant information as they reason their way to an incorrect answer, when 
in fact they should simply ignore it.  The use of irrelevant information in student answers has 
been observed in many studies, such as those by McDermott looking at common student 
difficulties in understanding motion (McDermott, 1984; McDermott et al., 1987). 
Previous research, described in Chapter 1, has shown that there is competition for 
attention between bottom-up and top-down processes as people view visual stimuli.  The key 
question addressed in the current study is how these processes interact when answering physics 
problems.  We use eye movement data to infer the extent to which bottom-up and top-down 
processes influence people’s attention as they answer introductory conceptual physics questions 
containing diagrams.  
We hypothesize that those with adequate domain knowledge to correctly answer a 
problem will spend more time fixating on thematically relevant areas of a diagram that provide 
the solution to the problem than on irrelevant areas of the diagram.  Conversely, we predict that 
those who answer incorrectly will spend more time fixating elsewhere in the diagram.  More 
specifically, based on previous research in physics education concerning novice-like 
misconceptions, which consistently lead to incorrect answers, we hypothesize that those 
answering the problem incorrectly will spend more time fixating on areas of the diagram 
                                                
1The work in this chapter has been published previously as: 
 
Madsen, A. M., Larson, A. M., Loschky, L. C., & Rebello, N. S. (2012). Differences in visual attention between 
those who correctly and incorrectly answer physics problems. Physical Review Special Topics - Physics Education 
Research, 8 (1), 010122, doi:10.1103/PhysRevSTPER.8.010122. (included under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 3.0 License) 
 
Madsen, A., Larson, A., Loschky, L., & Rebello, N. S. (2012 ). Using ScanMatch scores to understand differences 
in eye movements between correct and incorrect solvers on physics problems. Paper presented at the Symposium on 
Eye Tracking Research and Applications, Santa Barbara, CA, doi: 10.1145/2168556.2168591, copyright ACM 
2012. 
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consistent with a novice-like conception. These participants will initially attend to perceptually 
salient areas of the diagram, but will quickly disengage their attention from these areas and 
instead attend to novice-like areas. Such effects would suggest a strong role for top-down factors 
in guiding attention while solving physics problems involving diagrams. 
Alternatively, it has been shown that perceptual salience has a larger influence on novice 
learners’ eye movements than those with more domain knowledge.  Based on this finding, we 
could predict that the fixated locations of those who answer incorrectly are more likely to be 
influenced by perceptual salience than those who have adequate domain knowledge.  Such 
effects would suggest a strong role for bottom-up factors in guiding attention during physics 
problem solving with diagrams.  Thus, a key question is whether the attention of people who 
answer physics problems incorrectly is more influenced by the top-down factor of novice-like 
misconceptions or by the bottom-up factor of the perceptually salient areas of the diagram. 
In this chapter, we address Research Question 1, which asks, “Does visual attention differ 
between those who correctly and incorrectly answer physics problems which contain relevant 
information in a diagram?” and goes on to ask, “Are these differences in visual attention related 
to top-down cognitive processes or bottom-up perceptual processes?” In order to answer these 
general questions in more detail, we examined the following further specified three-part research 
question: 
How does the correctness or incorrectness of one’s answer to a physics problem 
involving a diagram relate to the time spent looking at those areas of the diagram that are: 
a) thematically relevant to the problem’s solution? Or 
b) consistent with novice-like misconceptions? Or  
c) perceptually salient? 
 Study 1: Interviews to Determine Novice-Like Areas of Interest  
 Study 1: Methods 
In order to define areas of a physics problem diagram that contain visual information 
related to a novice-like misconception, we conducted individual interviews with students 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course. We specifically looked at the interview segments 
where participants provided incorrect answers to the physics problems and observed the areas of 
the diagram that students identified and discussed while giving their verbal explanation. This 
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information was used to define “novice-like” areas of interest (AOI) which a participant who 
answered incorrectly would use to come to their answer. These areas of interest will be used in 
the analysis for Study 2.   
 Participants 
The participants were 13 students (eight females) enrolled in an introductory psychology 
course. All of the students had taken at least one physics course in high school, though some had 
taken an introductory physics course at the university level as well.  They were given course 
credit for participation.  
 Materials 
The materials consisted of 10 multiple-choice conceptual physics problems covering 
various topics in introductory physics including energy, kinematics, and graphing of motion (See 
Appendix A for a list of problems.).  Each problem contained a diagram that had a thematically 
relevant visual component that students needed to attend to in order to correctly answer the 
question.  For example, in Problem 4 (see Appendix A), to compare the speeds of ball A and ball 
B, one must attend to the distances between the balls at each time interval and ignore the point 
where the balls are aligned spatially.  So, the distance between balls at two seconds and three 
seconds is the relevant area to attend to. These problems were chosen based on prior experience 
of the researchers which indicated that these problems could be answered using common naïve 
conceptions or improperly applied conceptual resources or ontological categories (depending on 
ones theoretical view) documented in physics education literature (McDermott, 1984;  
McDermott & Redish, 1999; McDermott et al., 1987). 
 Procedure 
Each participant took part in an individual session which was between 20 and 40 minutes 
long.  At the beginning of the session, participants were given a short explanation of the goal of 
the interview and the purpose of the research.  Further, they were instructed to think aloud and 
explain their reasoning process as they answered each question.  They were told they might be 
asked additional clarifying questions during their explanations.  Participants were given one 
problem at a time, each printed on an 8 1/2 x 11 sheet of paper.  They were allowed to write or 
draw on the problems as they deemed necessary.  If a participant’s answer was not clear, the 
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interviewer asked questions to clarify the meaning of the explanation.  Participants’ verbal 
explanations, gestures, and writing on the paper were recorded with a Flip video camera.  
 Study 1: Analysis 
The purpose of these interviews was to determine which portion of each diagram was 
attended to by incorrect problem solvers.  Therefore, only the interview segments where the 
participant gave a final incorrect answer were included in the analysis.  A phenomenographical 
approach was used to code the interviews (Marton, 1986).  Table 3.1 contains the answers and 
reasoning provided by participants who answered the problems incorrectly.  Four of the 10 
problems used in the interviews showed no consistent answering patterns among incorrect 
solvers after a first pass analysis.  These problems are not included here, as there were no 
identifiable novice-like areas to be utilized in Study 2. 
 Study 1: Results and Conclusion 
The six problems included in this analysis (see Appendix A) showed consistent incorrect 
reasoning patterns.  These answer patterns align well with previous findings in the literature.  
Student difficulties with distance vs. time graphs were studied extensively by McDermott, 
Rosenquist and van Zee (1987) and Beichner (1994).  McDermott, Rosenquist and van Zee 
interviewed students at all levels of introductory college physics as well as high school physics 
and physical science students. They found when students responded to a problem very similar to 
Problem 2 used in our study, they often selected the point where the graph crossed the x-axis 
because “the position was going from positive to negative,” instead of correctly choosing the 
point on the graph where the slope was zero.  In a similar study, Trowbridge and McDermott 
(1980) found that a common student misconception is the idea that when two objects have 
reached the same spatial position they have the same speed.  In their study, Trowbridge and 
McDermott used a problem very similar to Problem 4 in our study, and found that a substantial 
number of students chose the instant when the balls passed each other as the time when they 
were moving at the same speed.  In Problem 4 in our study, this instant of the balls passing is at 
one second, which is the most common incorrect answer we observed.  Conflating position and 
speed is also observed in Problems 3 and 7 in our study.  In Problem 7, we observed students 
incorrectly choosing the point where the graphs of two objects crossed as the point when the 
objects were moving at the same speed.  This crossing point is the place where the objects have 
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the same position, but not the same speed.  In Problem 3, we observed students choosing the 
points where the graph crosses the x-axis as the place where the object’s speed is zero. These 
crossing points are the places where the object has a zero position relative to the origin, but not a 
zero speed.  So the incorrect answers we observed on Problems 3 and 7 align well with this 
documented student difficulty. Viennot (McDermott, 1984; Viennot, 1979) also investigated 
student difficulties with force and motion.  She surveyed about 2,000 university and high school 
students in France, Belgium, and Britain and found that students often attempted to account for 
differences present in a diagram that may or may not be related to the problem solution. This is 
consistent with our findings in Problems 1 and 10. In Problem 1, tracks A and B are different, 
though one only needs to notice that the initial and final heights are the same, so the final speeds 
will be the same. Students who answered incorrectly in our study discussed the differences 
between the tracks to explain their answers. On Problem 10, one needs to notice that the heights 
of each slope are the same. Those who answered incorrectly in our study primarily reasoned 
using the fact that the slopes were changing.  
In sum, there was strong agreement between our interview findings and documented 
student difficulties in the literature.  This gave us confidence that the definitions of novice-like 
areas of interest, for each physics problem, do indeed represent the most common novice-like 
answers of the larger population of introductory physics students. 
  
32 
 
Table 3.1 Number of students providing each answer and reasoning on conceptual physics 
questions with a diagram.  
Question # and Description Answer Reasoning # of Responses 
Q1. Roller Coaster Compares drops and climbs on 
tracks A and B 2 
 
Final speed B > 
Final speed A 
Height of initial drop on track A 
> height of initial drop on track B 2 
 Final speed A > 
Final speed B 
Compares drops and climbs on 
tracks A and B 5 
    
Q2. Distance Time Graph 1 Point C Distance changes from positive to 
negative 5 
    
Q3. Distance Time Graph 2 Distance is zero 2 
 
Point A 
Distance and time are zero 2 
 Points A and C Distance and time are zero 1 
 Point C Distance goes from negative to 
positive 1 
    
Q4. Balls on Tracks 1 second Balls at the same position at same 
time 5 
 The balls are the same and have 
same acceleration 1 
 
1.5 seconds 
Comparing distances between 
balls on track B. 1 
    
Q7. Distance Time Graph 3 Points A and E At point A objects have traveled 
zero distance at t=0 seconds, at 
point E objects are at same 
position at same time 
2 
 Objects traveled same distance in 
same time 3 
 
Point E 
That is the point where the lines 
cross 2 
    
Q10. Skier on Slope B > C = A 1 
 B > C > A 
Steepness of slope influences 
speed 
1 
 Steepness of slopes influences 
speed, kinetic energy and 
potential energy 
2 
 
A > B > C 
Steepness of slope directly related 
to change in potential energy 1 
 B > C > A Relates slope, height and width of 
segment to change in potential 
energy 
1 
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 Study 2: Determining Differences in Visual Selective Attention Based on 
Correctness of Problem Solution 
 Study 2: Method 
 Participants 
 There were 24 participants in the study (three females, two were graduate students and 
one was a psychology student) with two different levels of experience in physics. Ten 
participants were first-year through fifth-year PhD students in physics who had either taught an 
introductory physics course or been a teaching assistant for an introductory physics lab.  One 
participant was a postdoctoral candidate in physics who had received his PhD within the last two 
years and had teaching experience. Thirteen participants were enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course and had taken at least one physics course in high school, though some had 
also taken an introductory physics course at the university level.  The PhD students and post-doc 
participated as volunteers and the psychology students received course credit for their 
participation. Because we were looking to compare those who answered the physics problems 
correctly to those who answered incorrectly, we selected participants with a broad range of 
experience. We expected that the PhD students would answer correctly, while the psychology 
students might answer incorrectly, though we knew that this might not always be the case since 
there is a wide distribution of expertise among introductory physics students and physics 
graduate students (Mason & Singh, 2011). 
 Materials 
The materials consisted of the six multiple-choice introductory physics problems 
analyzed in Study 1 (see Appendix A).  
 Procedure 
Each participant took part in an individual session lasting 20-40 minutes. At the 
beginning of the session, participants were given a short explanation of what to expect in the 
study. After calibrating the eye tracking system, if the validation’s mean error was ≤ 0.50° of 
visual angle, the experiment began, otherwise the calibration and validation was repeated until 
successful. Next, the participant was instructed to silently answer 10 multiple-choice questions 
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while their eye movements were recorded. Participants indicated their answer to each question 
using number keys on the keyboard. Between questions, a calibration drift correction procedure 
was done to ensure proper calibration throughout the experiment. This procedure required the 
participant to fixate on a small white dot in the middle of a gray screen and press a key. Pressing 
the key caused the screen to advance to the next problem when the participant’s fixation was 
within a pre-defined area around the white dot. Finally, each participant was asked to provide a 
cued verbal retrospective report (Van Gog, Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Witte, 2005) for which 
they were shown a replay of their eye movements on each problem and asked to explain their 
thought processes (either after watching the replay of their eye movements or concurrently while 
watching them). This method has been found to produce more in-depth explanations than 
without viewing one’s eye movements. If a participant’s explanation was unclear, they were 
asked follow-up questions. Participants were given unlimited time to answer the questions and 
provide retrospective verbal reports. Verbal explanations and gestures were recorded with a Flip 
video camcorder. 
 Study 2: Analysis  
To analyze participants’ eye fixations, we defined areas of interest (AOIs). There were 
three different types of AOIs identified for each physics problem analyzed in Study 1. These 
types were thematically relevant AOIs, perceptually salient AOIs, and novice-like AOIs. The 
definition for the thematically relevant AOI came from three independent raters, one physics 
professor, and two PhD students in physics, who indicated, on each of the problems, the area 
which contained visual information necessary to answer the problem. The definition for the 
perceptually salient AOI in each problem was determined using an implementation of the Itti, 
Koch and Niebur saliency map algorithm in MATLAB (Harel, 2010). This MATLAB toolbox 
produced a heat map representation of relative saliency over the entire diagram for each problem 
(see Figure 3.1). The area on the diagram with the highest rating of saliency was used to define 
the perceptually salient AOI. If there were several portions of the diagram with the highest level 
of perceptual salience, according to the salience map, then all of these areas were used when 
defining the perceptually salient AOI.  
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The novice-like AOI was defined based on the interviews described above in Study 1. 
Figure 232 shows the thematically relevant, novice-like and perceptually salient areas of the 
problem whose heat map is shown in Figure 3.1.   
 
Figure 3.1 Heat map of perceptual salience created using Itti, Koch and Niebur’s salience 
algorithm. Red indicates area of highest perceptual salience. 
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Figure 3.2 Thematically relevant AOI is the distance between balls at 2-3 seconds. Novice-
like AOI is when the balls are at the same position, at 1 second. Perceptually salient AOI is 
oval around Ball B at 3 seconds and 4 seconds.   
 
 
The areas of the diagram referred to by the majority of the interviewees from Study 1 
who answered the problem incorrectly were defined as the novice-like AOI for each of the 
problems. These areas are listed in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Novice-like AOIs defined based on the most common incorrect student responses 
in Study 1.    
Problem Novice-like AOI 
1 Roller coaster tracks 
2 Point where graph crosses x-axis 
3 Origin of graph 
4 Point where balls A and B line up spatially 
7 Point where graphs of two objects cross 
10 Slopes A, B and C 
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These thematically relevant, perceptually salient and novice-like AOIs were applied to 
the problems analyzed in Study 1. Additionally, an AOI containing the entire diagram was 
applied to each of the problems. The total amount of time each participant spent fixating on each 
AOI was determined (total fixation time), as well as the total time spent looking at the entire 
diagram. To account for differences in total viewing time on each problem, the percentage of 
time spent in each respective AOI was determined by dividing the total viewing time, for each 
participant, in a specified AOI by the total time spent viewing the entire diagram (Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003). The percentage of time spent in each type of interest area was compared 
between students who answered the problem correctly and those who answered incorrectly for 
the entire problem set. There were a few instances where the eye movement data file was 
corrupted for a participant on a single problem. In this case, the participant’s data was not 
included in the analysis.  
We were also interested in determining if perceptual salience played a greater role in 
influencing eye movements in the first two seconds of viewing the problem diagram. To do this, 
we determined the first time the participant’s eye left the problem statement to look elsewhere. 
Applying the same AOIs described previously, we selected two seconds of fixation data 
immediately following the transition from reading the problem statement to looking elsewhere in 
the problem. It should be noted that not all participants read the problem statement, viewed the 
diagram, and then the answer choices. Some participants looked from the problem statement to 
the diagram very briefly and then continued reading and some went from the problem statement 
to the answer choices. Thus, the first two seconds of fixation data represents many different 
patterns of viewing. We then converted the fixation time from the first two seconds to a 
percentage and compared the percentage of time spent in each type of interest area between 
students who answered the problems correctly versus those who answered incorrectly. 
 Study 2: Results and Discussion 
Mixed factorial 2 x 6 ANOVAs with proportion of time in each AOI type as the 
dependent variable and problem number and correctness of answer as independent variables 
were conducted for all three AOI types. Results for the full trial period are reported in Table 3.3. 
Results for the first two seconds of viewing the diagram are reported in Table 3.5.  
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  Full Trial Period 
For the full trial period, we found a significant main effect for correctness of answer as 
well as for problem number for all three AOI types. We were looking for a main effect of 
correctness, as this would indicate there are differences in percentage of time spent in an AOI 
between those who answered correctly and those who answered incorrectly. The main effect of 
correctness addresses our research questions and will be further analyzed below. The main effect 
of problem number indicates there is at least one difference in proportion of time in each AOI 
type between different problems. We were not interested in how the proportion of time spent 
fixating varies between problems, as this is not relevant to our research questions, so the effect of 
problem number will not be further analyzed. We found a significant interaction between 
problem number and correctness of answer in the perceptually salient AOI. This means the 
relationship between correctness and time spent in the perceptually salient area is different across 
problems. This interaction is not relevant to our research question and will not be further 
investigated. 
 
Table 3.3 Results of mixed factorial ANOVA for all three AOI types for full problem 
period.  
 Thematically Relevant AOI Novice-like AOI 
Perceptually Salient 
AOI 
Effect F p F p F p 
Problem # F(5,128)=8.9 <.001 F(5,128)=14.1 <.001 F(5,128)=18.5 <.001 
Correctness of 
Answer F(1,128)=48.8 <.001 F(1,28)=34.0 <.001 F(1,128)=26.3 <.001 
Problem #* 
Correctness of 
Answer 
F(5,128)=0.88 0.500 F(5,128)=0.58 0.716 F(5,128)=4.6  .001 
 
The main effect of correctness was further analyzed for each of the six different problems 
using a one-way ANOVA with percentage of time for all three AOI types as the dependent 
variable and correctness of answer as the independent variable. Results of one-way ANOVAs for 
each type of AOI for the full trial period are reported in Table 3.4. Mean percentage of fixation 
time, standard error for the correct and incorrect responders and the effect size using omega 
squared for each question are also shown in Table 3.4. An asterisk indicates a significant 
difference at the α=.05 level. 
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Table 3.4 Mean percentage time spent (± std err) and results of one-way ANOVA during 
entire problem period for thematically relevant, novice-like and perceptually salient AOIs 
for participants who answered the question correctly/incorrectly. 
AOI Type Problem 
Answered  
Correctly 
Answered 
Incorrectly F p ω 2 
Thematically 
Relevant 1 
46.6 (± 5.5)  
(n=11) 
33.2 (±5.7)  
(n=11) F(1,20)=2.9 0.107 - 
 2* 24.4 (± 2.9)  (n=13) 
11.6 (±3.3)  
(n=10) F(1,21)=8.6 0.008 .06 
 3* 28.5 (± 4.1)  (n=18) 
8.9 (±2.3)  
(n=6) F(1,22)=7.1 0.014 .14 
 4*  49.8 (± 3.9)  (n=14) 
25.5 (±4.1)  
(n=9) 
F(1,21)= 
17.5  <.001 .30 
 7*  36.7 (±5.5)  (n=15) 
10.3 (± 2.1) 
(n=9) 
F(1, 22) 
=13.1 0.002 .36 
 10* 29.0 (± 5.0)  (n=11) 
15.1 (± 2.7)  
(n=13) F(1,22)=6.6 0.018 .08 
       
Novice-Like 1* 22.3 (± 4.5)  (n=11) 
43.5 (±7.3)  
(n=11) F(1,20)=6.0 0.020 .21 
 2* 12.7 (± 3.3)  (n=13) 
27.2 (±4.8)  
(n=10) F(1,21)=6.6 0.018 .08 
 3* 19.8 (± 3.7)  (n=18) 
39.4 (±5.4)  
(n=6) F(1,22)=7.5  0.012 .14 
 4 18.1 (± 2.5) (n=14) 
26.8 (±3.9)  
(n=9) F(1,21)=4.0  0.058 - 
 7* 12.6 (±2.6)  (n=15) 
25.0 (± 6.0) 
(n=9) F(1,22)=4.7 0.041 .05 
 10* 41.2 (± 6.6)  (n=11) 
62.2 (± 5.1)  
(n=13) F(1,22)=6.5 0.018 .23 
       
Perceptually 
Salient 1 
6.6 (± 1.9)  
(n=11) 
13.0 (±2.5)  
(n=11) F(1,20)=4.1 0.056 - 
 2 19.3 (± 4.1)  (n=13) 
28.2 (±4.9)  
(n=10) F(1,21)=1.9 0.179 - 
 3* 9.5 (± 2.2)  (n=18) 
30.5 (±4.6)  
(n=6) 
F(1,22) 
=20.1  0.001 .17 
 4  11.9 (± 1.7)  (n=14) 
9.0 (±2.2)  
(n=9) F(1,22)=1.1 0.316 - 
 7*  19.1 (±3.0)  (n=15) 
39.5 (± 5.6) 
(n=9) 
F(1,22) 
=12.3 0.002 .21 
 10 4.2 (± 1.1)  (n=11) 
6.3 (± 1.6)  
(n=13) F(1,22)=1.1 0.305 - 
 
  
40 
We found that on five out of six problems used in Study 2, those who answered the 
problem correctly spent a higher percentage of total viewing time fixating on thematically 
relevant areas in the problem diagram (Table 3.4). Those who answered correctly likely had the 
domain knowledge needed to solve each problem, and therefore spent more time viewing the 
relevant areas in each diagram. This result is consistent with previous findings where those with 
high levels of domain knowledge in a discipline, such as identifying fish locomotion (Jarodzka et 
al., 2010), art (Antes & Kristjanson, 1991), and chess (Charness et al., 2001), spend more time 
looking at areas of diagrams and pictures relevant to a task. Our finding is evidence for top-down 
processes playing a key role in guiding visual attention when solving physics problems correctly.  
We also found that on five out of six problems, those who answered the problem 
incorrectly spent a higher percentage of total viewing time looking at areas of the diagram 
consistent with a novice-like response (Table 3.4). Furthermore, on the one problem that did not 
quite reach statistical significance (p = .058) the effect was in the same direction as the other five 
problems. These novice-like AOIs were determined through individual interviews described in 
Study 1, and were consistent with the physics education literature describing common student 
misconceptions. Importantly, the finding that incorrect solvers spent more time fixating on 
novice-like areas is evidence for their visual attention being guided by top-down processes.  
However, instead of attention being guided by scientifically correct domain knowledge, incorrect 
problem solvers’ attention was guided by novice-like misconceptions. Thus, when solving 
physics problems, top-down processing plays a key role in guiding visual selective attention 
either to thematically relevant areas, or novice-like areas, depending upon the scientific 
correctness of a student’s physics knowledge. 
Concerning the effects of bottom-up processes in guiding attention during physics 
problem solving, we found that those who answered incorrectly spent significantly more time in 
perceptually salient areas during the full problem period on only two of the six problems, namely 
Problems 3 and 7. Nevertheless, for five of the six problems the effect was in the predicted 
direction, such that incorrect problem solvers spent a higher percentage of total time fixating on 
the perceptually salient AOIs than the correct problem solvers.  However, four of those effects 
were not statistically significant.  A likely explanation for this result is that in Problems 3 and 7, 
the perceptually salient AOI partially or completely overlapped with the novice-like AOI 
(Figures 3.3 and 3.4), which was not the case for the other four problems. We have already 
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shown that those who answered the problem incorrectly spent significantly more time fixating on 
the novice-like AOIs on Problems 3 and 7 than those who answered the problem correctly. So 
the significant result for Problems 3 and 7 for the perceptually salient AOI is likely due to this 
AOI overlapping with the novice-like AOI.  This result also seems to indicate that attending to 
the perceptually salient area is not necessarily a good predictor of correctness.  These results 
appear to be consistent with a study of change blindness that found that problem solvers seldom 
notice changes in color, even though color is most perceptually salient (Feil & Mestre, 2010). 
Thus, when considering the full time period of problem solving, perceptual salience appears to 
have played a minimal role in guiding the attention of incorrect physics problem solvers. 
Nevertheless, previous vision research has suggested that the effects of bottom-up perceptual 
salience on eye movements are limited to the first two seconds of viewing a stimulus (Carmi & 
Itti, 2006).  Thus, this seeming null result could be argued to have resulted from diluting the 
effect of saliency by including eye-movement data from the entire duration of the trial, rather 
than only the first two seconds.  We therefore reanalyzed the data including only the first two 
seconds that participants spent viewing the diagram. 
 
Figure 3.3 Itti, Niebur and Koch saliency map for Problem 3. The perceptually salient AOI 
overlapped the novice-like AOI, which was at the origin of the graph. 
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Figure 3.4 Itti, Niebur and Koch saliency map for Problem 7. The perceptually salient AOI 
partially overlapped with the novice-like AOI, which was at the point where the two lines 
cross. 
 
 First Two Seconds After Leaving Problem Statement 
To reanalyze the data including only the first two seconds of viewing a diagram, we 
completed a mixed factorial 2 x 6 ANOVA with proportion of time in each AOI type as the 
dependent variable and problem number and correctness of answer as independent variables for 
all three AOI types for the first two seconds of viewing the diagram. These results are reported in 
Table 3.5.  We were looking for a main effect of correctness, as this would indicate there are 
differences in percentage of time spent in an AOI between those who answered correctly and 
those who answered incorrectly. For the first two seconds after leaving the problem statement, 
we found no main effect for correctness of answer for any of the AOI types. So, there are no 
significant differences in proportion of time spent fixating in the AOI types between those who 
answered correctly and those who answered incorrectly for any of the problems and no further 
analysis was conducted.  
We did find a main effect for problem number for the novice-like and perceptually salient 
AOIs. This means for each of these AOIs, there is at least one difference in proportion of time 
between the different problems when considering the data for all participants. We were not 
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interested in how the proportion of time spent fixating varies between problems, as this is not 
relevant to our research questions. We also found a significant interaction between problem 
number and correctness of answer in the thematically relevant AOI. This means the relationship 
between correctness and time spent in the thematically relevant area is different across problems. 
This interaction also does not address our research questions, and is not analyzed further.  
The mean percentage of fixation time spent looking in thematically relevant, novice-like 
and perceptually salient AOIs for participants who answered the question correctly and 
incorrectly for the first two seconds of viewing the diagram is displayed in Table 3.6. As 
mentioned above, there are no significant differences between the percentage of fixation time for 
correct and incorrect solvers shown in this table.  
 
Table 3.5 Results of mixed factorial ANOVA for all three AOI types for the first two 
seconds of viewing.. 
 Thematically Relevant AOI 
Novice-like  
AOI 
Perceptually Salient 
AOI 
Effect F p F p F p 
Problem # F(5,128)=2.10 0.069 F(5,128)=6.72 <.001 F(5,128)=10.7 <.001 
Correctness of 
Answer F(1,128)=.495 0.483 F(1,28)=2.03 0.156 F(1,128=2.47 0.119 
Problem # * 
Correctness of 
Answer 
F(5,128)=2.30 0.048 F(5,128)=.036 0.999 F(5,128)=.671  0.646 
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Table 3.6 Mean percentage fixation time spent (± std err) during the first two seconds after 
leaving the problem statement for thematically relevant, novice-like and perceptually 
salient AOIs for participants who answered the question correctly/incorrectly 
AOI Type Problem 
Answered 
Correctly 
Answered 
Incorrectly 
Thematically 
Relevant 1 
13.5 (± 6.8)  
(n=11) 
31.1 (±6.3)  
(n=11) 
 2 10.9 (± 2.9)  (n=13) 
8.6 (±3.4)  
(n=10) 
 3 9.7 (± 3.1)  (n=18) 
9.7 (±5.0)  
(n=6) 
 4 26.5 (± 5.0)  (n=14) 
11.9 (±6.5)  
(n=9) 
 7 17.6 (±6.5)  (n=15) 
17.6 (± 2.4) 
(n=9) 
 10 13.0 (± 4.2)  (n=11) 
9.7 (± 4.1)  
(n=13) 
Novice-Like 1 2.6 (± 1.4)  (n=11) 
9.4 (±2.7)  
(n=11) 
 2 9.4 (± 4.3)  (n=13) 
13.0 (±6.2)  
(n=10) 
 3 12.1 (± 3.2)  (n=18) 
15.2 (±9.0)  
(n=6) 
 4 17.6 (± 4.2)  (n=14) 
22.3 (±6.1)  
(n=9) 
 7 17.4 (± 4.7)  (n=15) 
20.8 (± 7.6) 
(n=9) 
 10 30.7 (± 7.0)  (n=11) 
34.6 (± 5.2)  
(n=13) 
Perceptually 
Salient 1 
0.7 (± 0.7)  
(n=11) 
2.5 (±1.8)  
(n=11) 
 2 10.8 (± 3.2)  (n=13) 
21.8 (±8.1)  
(n=10) 
 3 8.3 (± 2.7)  (n=18) 
9.0 (±4.1)  
(n=6) 
 4 2.5 (± 2.5)  (n=14) 
2.3 (±2.3)  
(n=9) 
 7 23.2 (±4.4)  (n=15) 
32.5 (± 8.0) 
(n=9) 
 10 10.9 (± 4.9)  (n=11) 
11.6 (± 3.4)  
(n=13) 
 
The reanalysis of the data for the first two seconds of viewing the diagram found no 
statistically significant differences between correct and incorrect solvers on any of the problems 
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for the perceptually salient AOI. Indeed, there were no statistically significant differences 
between correct and incorrect solvers in time spent in the thematically relevant or novice-like 
AOIs. In sum, we found no support for the hypothesis that perceptual salience influences visual 
selective attention more for incorrect problem solvers during the first two seconds of diagram 
viewing. This result is consistent with previous studies (Einhauser et al., 2008; Hegarty et al., 
2010) that have shown that top-down influences on visual attention tend to dominate bottom-up 
influences when a viewer is given a specific goal or task. Nevertheless, such null results for the 
effects of bottom-up saliency on visual attention are consistent with our own results, which 
considered both the full problem solving time period, and only the first two seconds, and found 
little if any effects. 
However, before completely rejecting the hypothesis that bottom-up saliency affects 
attentional selection during physics problem solving, we must consider two observations that 
provide partial support for it. First, it may be that the early effect of perceptual salience on eye 
movements was present; however, the data lacked sufficient statistical power to detect it.  Some 
support for this explanation is shown by comparing the mean difference for the correct versus 
incorrect problem solvers for the perceptually salient AOIs for the first two seconds of viewing 
the diagram (Table 3.6). Specifically, the percentage of time spent looking in the perceptually 
salient AOI is higher for incorrect solvers than correct problem solvers on five of the six 
problems, though not statistically significantly so.  Thus, it is possible that a larger study with 
more observations might show this effect to be statistically significant. Secondly, the perceptual 
salience model proposed by Itti and Koch (2000) predicted that early in scene viewing eye 
movements are more influenced by bottom-up perceptual information than top-down knowledge.  
Therefore, the saliency model would predict that early in viewing a physics problem, correct and 
incorrect problem solvers would not have had sufficient amount time to apply their (correct or 
incorrect) top-down knowledge to guide their attention to thematically relevant or novice-like 
areas of the diagram.  If so, during the first two seconds of viewing the diagram, there should be 
no difference between correct and incorrect problems solvers’ percentage of total fixation time in 
either the thematically relevant or novice-like AOIs.  These data support this hypothesis, which 
shows that there is no significant difference in viewing time for thematically relevant AOIs 
between correct and incorrect problem solvers. In sum, the data showed essentially no influence 
by top-down domain knowledge during the first two seconds of diagram viewing, though such 
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effects were statistically significant later in time, when considering the full problem solving time 
period.  Thus, based on the above two observations, we must withhold complete rejection of the 
hypothesis that bottom-up salience affects the visual selective attention of incorrect physics 
problem solvers.  Even so, such an interpretation of the data should be made cautiously since it is 
based on null effects.  
 Study 3- Using ScanMatch Scores to Understand Differences in Eye 
Movements Between Correct and Incorrect Solvers on Physics Problems 
In this study, we reanalyzed the data from Study 2 to further investigate the role of 
perceptual salience in guiding the attention of those who incorrectly answer conceptual physics 
questions containing a diagram. A scan path analysis was performed with the ScanMatch 
algorithm (Cristino, Mathôt, Theeuwes, & Gilchrist, 2010). This scan path analysis takes into 
account both spatial and temporal aspects of the eye movements and may be more sensitive to 
differences between correct and incorrect solvers. 
We compare the average ScanMatch scores produced by comparing the correct solvers to 
one another (C-C comparison), the incorrect solvers to one another (I-I comparison), and the 
correct solvers to the incorrect solvers (C-I comparison). We hypothesize that if the incorrect 
solvers are being primarily led by the perceptual salience of the elements in the diagram, then it 
is likely that they will attend to the same elements in a similar order. For example, attention 
would be first guided to the most perceptually salient region, followed by the next most salient 
region, and so on (Itti & Koch, 2000). Thus, the I-I comparison would have higher ScanMatch 
scores than the C-C comparison, who might attend to perceptually salient areas early on in 
diagram viewing; however, the variable onset of top-down processes on eye movements would 
result in greater temporal and spatial variability of gaze towards thematically-relevant elements 
in the diagram, resulting in lower ScanMatch scores. The I-I and C-C groups would also have 
higher ScanMatch scores than the C-I group, since the correct solvers and incorrect solvers are 
known to spend different amounts of times looking at thematically-relevant and novice-like 
elements. 
Conversely, if top-down processes are directing the attention of incorrect solvers, namely 
some form of naïve theory, the ScanMatch score of the I-I comparison should be similar to that 
of the C-C comparison. The domain knowledge possessed by those in both comparison groups, 
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whether correct or incorrect knowledge, guides their attention to look at certain elements of the 
problem, but not in a particular order. Once again, the I-I comparison and the C-C comparison 
should have higher ScanMatch scores than the C-I comparison.  
In summary:  
Hypothesis 1: If perceptual salience is primarily influencing the attention of incorrect 
solvers, the I-I comparison will have higher ScanMatch scores than the C-C 
comparison. 
Hypothesis 2: If top-down processes utilizing naïve theories are primarily influencing the 
attention of incorrect solvers, the I-I comparison and the C-C comparison will have 
similar ScanMatch scores, and these will both be higher than the C-I comparison 
 Study 3: Methods 
Participants, materials, apparatus and procedure are identical to those described in Study 
2 above.  
 Study 3: Analysis and Results 
We used the ScanMatch toolbox for MatLab (Cristino et al., 2010) to compare the scan 
paths of our participants based on the correctness of their answers given for each problem. We 
calculated ScanMatch scores for three different comparisons of participants’ scan paths. The 
correct-correct comparison (C-C) contained scores comparing each participant who answered a 
question correctly to one another. The incorrect-incorrect comparison (I-I) contained scores 
comparing each participant who answered a question incorrectly to one another. Finally, the 
correct-incorrect comparison (C-I) contained scores comparing those who answered correctly to 
those who answered incorrectly. We then completed a one-way ANOVA comparing the 
ScanMatch scores of the C-C comparison, I-I comparison, and C-I comparison for each problem. 
When we obtained a significant result, we used post-hoc contrasts to determine which 
comparisons contained a significant difference. We then referenced the mean score values for 
each comparison to determine the direction of this difference. When homogeneity of variance 
was violated, we used the Games-Howell test for the post-hoc contrasts, otherwise we used 
Tukey’s HSD test for the contrasts.  In Study 2, for which this analysis is a follow-up, the eye 
movements of only six of the 10 problems participants viewed were analyzed. This is because we 
found that four of the problems did not contain a consistent novice-like area of interest. On those 
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four problems, participants who answered incorrectly reasoned from a wide variety of areas in 
the problem diagram. Without a precise definition for the novice-like area of interest, these 
problems could not be included in the original analysis. This scan path analysis is a follow-up on 
the previous analysis, so we analyze only those six problems included in the original study.  
We found statistically significant main effects on three of the six problems tested (Table 
3.7). On problem 1, the ANOVA showed a statistically significant main effect of comparison, 
F(2,220) = 7.324, p = .001. The contrasts revealed that the I-I comparison had significantly 
higher ScanMatch scores than the C-I comparison (p < .001).  Problem 2 also showed significant 
main effect of comparison, F(2,250) = 6.308, p = .002. The contrasts showed that the I-I 
comparison (p < .001) had a higher ScanMatch score than the C-I comparison. Further, the I-I 
comparison had a significantly higher score than the C-C comparison (p = .005). A significant 
main effect was also found for problem 10, F(2,273) = 3.583, p = .029. On this problem, the I-I 
comparison had a significantly higher ScanMatch score than the C-I comparison (p = .05). There 
were no differences found between comparisons on problems 3, 4 and 7.  
 
Table 3.7 Mean ScanMatch score for C-C, I-I, and C-I comparison for each problem used 
in the study. 
Problem Comparison Mean SD (±) ω 2 
C-C (n=47) .396 .068 
I-I (n=55) .414 .056 
1* 
(n=11 correct 
n=11 incorrect) C-I (n=121) .370 .080 
.06 
C-C (n=90) .330 .151 
I-I (n=36) .413 .047 
2* 
(n=14 correct 
n=10 incorrect) C-I (n=127) .371 .119 
.19 
C-C (n=137) .351 .093 
I-I (n=21) .400 .108 
3 
(n=17 correct 
n=7 incorrect) C-I (n=119) .364 .100 
 
C-C (n=90) .379 .088 
I-I (n=35) .398 .055 
4 
(n=14 correct 
n=9 incorrect) C-I (n=126) .362 .088 
 
C-C (n=105) .312 .125 
I-I (n=36) .311 .119 
7 
(n=15 correct 
n=9 incorrect) C-I (n=135) .298 .112 
 
C-C (n=55) .333 .086 
I-I (n=78) .368 .091 
10* 
(n=11 correct 
n=13 incorrect) C-I (n=143) .340 .078 
.04 
* indicated a significant difference at the α=.05 level 
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Figure 3.5 Box and whiskers plot showing the median, max, min and 1st and 3rd quartile of 
the ScanMatch scores for each group.!
 
 
 Study 3: Conclusions 
We did not find significant differences in ScanMatch scores between those in the C-C 
comparisons and those in the I-I comparisons on five of the six problems analyzed in this study. 
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the attention of incorrect solvers is primarily 
directed by top-down naïve theories and not the relative perceptual salience of the elements. This 
finding aligns well with our previous findings (Study 2) that showed no significant difference in 
the percentage of fixation time in the perceptually salient areas of the diagram during the full 
problem period, or the first two seconds of viewing the diagram, when the effects of perceptual 
salience should be most pronounced. It also aligns well with the findings showing significant 
differences in the percentage of time incorrect solvers spent in the novice-like areas of the 
diagram and the percentage of time correct solvers spent in the thematically-relevant areas of the 
diagram.  
We found significant differences between the I-I and C-I comparisons on three of the six 
problems. These differences were expected as we have previously seen that correct solvers and 
incorrect solvers spend different amounts of time looking at thematically-relevant and novice-
like elements in the problem, so their scan paths scores are likely to be different. It is curious that 
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we did not find that the I-I comparison and the C-C comparison had higher ScanMatch scores 
than the C-I comparison on all of the problems. The problems used in the study included a text 
problem statement, diagram, and multiple-choice answers. The hypotheses set forward in this 
study assumed a similar reading pattern of the problem statement and answer choices for all 
participants. The hypotheses were formed assuming only differences in how the participants 
looked at the diagram. Differences in reading the problem statement and answer choices may 
have overwhelmed small differences in diagram viewing, resulting in no difference in the 
ScanMatch scores of the C-C and I-I comparisons compared to the C-I comparison. 
 Implications 
These findings may have implications for educational interventions aimed at helping 
novices learn to answer such conceptual questions correctly. Researchers in physics education 
have devoted much attention to addressing these consistent wrong answer patterns by changing 
the way students think about how the world works. If it were true that this problem had an 
underlying perceptual component, these interventions would need to instead help students learn 
how to ignore salient elements and focus instead on thematically-relevant elements. The results 
of this study suggest that wrong answers have roots in the incorrect ways students think about 
how the world works, not how a problem diagram looks. So it seems that the educational 
interventions used to improve student understanding are on the right track.  
Overall, these findings motivate the investigation of visual cues to redirect individuals’ 
attention to relevant portions of the diagrams and potentially influence the way they reason about 
these questions. The problems used in Study 2 all contained AOIs consistent with novice-like 
misconceptions. Those who answered incorrectly spent more time looking at these novice-like 
AOIs. One way to help incorrect problem solvers pay attention to the relevant areas of a problem 
diagram is to overlay dynamic visual cues on it. Visual cues overlaid on physics problems such 
as those in the current study may help students to ignore the novice-like AOIs of diagrams, and 
instead pay attention to the thematically relevant AOIs in order to reason in a scientifically 
correct manner about the problem. The use of visual cues is explored in the work presented in 
Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 - Can Short Duration Visual Cues Influence Students’ 
Reasoning and Eye Movements in Physics Problems? 
 Introduction 
Based on successful use of visual cues in insight problem solving by Thomas and Lleras 
(2007) and others studies on visual cueing, we apply visual cueing to static physics problems in 
hopes that the cues will also serve as an implicit guide to improve problem solving performance.  
 Theoretical Background 
There are two relevant theoretical frameworks which help us interpret the function and 
mechanism of visual cueing.  The first, the Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning (Mayer, 
2001), pertains to the use of multimodal information in learning. The second, Representational 
Change Theory (Ohlsson, 1992), is related to the cognitive mechanism involved in problems that 
require insight to solve.  These have both been described in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Below 
we discuss the connections between these frameworks and the current study. In our current study 
we utilize visual cues that serve to select relevant information and integrate related elements in a 
problem diagram. We did not study organization cues.  
 Connections between Theoretical Background and Current Study 
We apply representational change theory to understand how visual cues can help learners 
solve physics problems. Ohlsson (1992) conceptualizes insight as “initial failure followed by 
eventual success.” He explains that insight occurs when the problem solver is competent to solve 
the problem before him/her, reaches an impasse in the problem solving process, and then 
successfully breaks this impasse. Representational Change Theory is valid for problem solving 
processes in which this impasse-insight sequence occurs and we claim that this sequence is likely 
to occur in our study. First, the nature of our problems lent themselves to impasse and insight. 
We used introductory conceptual physics problems requiring students to activate specific 
conceptual resources (Hammer, 2000). Since these questions are not given in any particular 
context, such as the end of a chapter or during lecture, the students must first realize the 
appropriate concept. If they cannot realize an appropriate concept, they may reach an impasse, 
which could be resolved when they see the visual cues and focus on relevant information. 
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Further, since these questions are conceptual, once a student realizes the appropriate concept to 
use, there is not a long set of mental steps or calculations before getting to an answer. Instead, 
the student applies the appropriate conceptual resource and can quickly realize an answer. The 
problem diagrams also contain visual information consistent with an incorrect, “novice-like” 
answer. Students who answer these problems incorrectly attend to this novice-like visual 
information and activate conceptual resources which lead to the wrong answer (Madsen, Larson, 
Loschky, & Rebello, 2012). So the student needs to not only realize the appropriate concept, but 
also must suppress the use of these novice-like concepts which lead to incorrect answers. In our 
study, students first answer an initial problem and if incorrect, see a very similar problem. 
Students may also reach an impasse when they repeatedly see very similar problems overlaid 
with visual cues. During this process, the visual cues draw students’ attention to areas they had 
previously ignored. The combination of answering a very similar problem several times while 
their attention is being redirected to an area they previously found irrelevant could cause them to 
second guess their previous answer. As they reconsider the diagram areas highlighted by visual 
cues, they may resolve their impasse with an insight, activate appropriate conceptual resources, 
and answer correctly. 
In order to resolve an impasse, we hypothesize that visual cues can serve to help the 
student re-represent a problem in their mind. In line with Representational Change Theory, the 
purpose of visual cues is to help the student replace an existing unproductive representation with 
a productive one or add to their existing representation until it is adequate to solve the problem. 
This re-representation occurs through three possible mechanisms: elaboration, re-encoding or 
constraint removal.  In our current study we explore visual cues that we believe help re-
representation occur through elaboration and re-encoding, but not constraint removal. 
 Elaboration involves adding new information to the problem. This is useful for a learner 
who has gathered insufficient information to form productive mental representation of the 
problem, and has thus reached an impasse. Integration cues can help facilitate the addition of 
critical new information by helping the learner attend to information in a particular order and/or 
help the learner make comparisons between different elements of the diagram. A learner 
attending to the information provided by these cues is prompted to activate previously dormant 
information from the long-term memory and eventually encode a new representation for the 
problems.   
  
53 
Re-encoding, unlike elaboration, involves not just adding new information, but rather 
backtracking through previous layers of the problem solving process, eliminating unproductive 
layers in their mental representation of the problem and creating new productive layers of the 
mental representation. The re-encoding process is especially important for the problems used in 
our study, as the diagrams for these problems each contain an area(s) consistent with most 
common incorrect answer. This feature of the problems makes it likely that the students will 
activate unproductive naïve concepts when reasoning to an answer. In order to help them re-
encode the problem representation in a scientifically accurate way selection cues could be used.  
Rather than provide new information that was not previously present in the diagram, these cues 
prompt the learner to suppress irrelevant information and enhance relevant information for 
solving the problem.  The learner attends to the previously ignored relevant information, which 
in turn activates previously dormant prior knowledge from long-term memory and eventually 
encodes a new representation for the problems.  
This study builds on previous research that investigated the visual attention of learners 
who correctly and incorrectly answer physics problems containing diagrams, which is described 
in Chapter 4.  This study uses four of the six problems used in that work. We hypothesize that 
visual cues will be especially useful on these particular problems for two reasons. First, our 
previous study showed that participants who answer these problems incorrectly spend less time 
looking at relevant areas and more time looking at novice-like areas. Further, in a similar study 
of expert chess players solving problems with two possible solutions, it was found that when the 
players had found the first solution, they reported looking for a better one, though the eye 
movement record indicated they continued to look at features of the problem related to the 
solution they had already found (Bilalić, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008). Although they tried to seek 
out the better solution, their attention was fixated on their first idea. We know that participants 
who answer our study problems incorrectly spend more time looking in these novice-like areas. 
If they are similar to the chess players, they may try to consider other solutions, but will keep 
their attention fixated on areas consistent with their first idea. Selection cues can improve 
problem solving by helping solvers ignore the “novice-like” areas of the diagram, attend to the 
“expert-like” areas, and create a new mental representation of the problem. Using the new 
representation, the leaner can activate relevant concepts in long-term memory, thus extending the 
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information available to the problem solver.  When the relevant concept is available to the 
solver, she can apply the concept to answer the question correctly.  
Second, the problems we used contained “expert-like” elements in the diagram that were 
spatially separate and needed to be compared. A learner at an impasse does not make the 
necessary connections between these elements that produce a productive mental representation 
of the problem. Integration cues can add information to the learner’s current mental 
representation by helping them make these necessary connections. To determine the most useful 
way to design the integration cues for these problems, we can use the eye movements of correct 
solvers from this study, look for patterns in the way correct solvers viewed the “expert-like” 
elements, and model our integration cues on these patterns.   
In the current study, we use a subset of the physics problems used in Chapter 3 as well as 
recordings of the eye movements of those who responded correctly to design the visual cues. In 
this chapter, we aim to answer the following Research Question 2 which states, “Can short 
duration dynamic selection/integration visual cues influence students’ reasoning and answers on 
physics questions with a diagram?” We will also explore the following sub-questions: 
• Does seeing these cues repeatedly on similar problems influence students’ reasoning 
and answer choices on transfer problems? 
• Does seeing these cues influence visual attention while the cues are shown as well as 
on transfer problems? 
 Method 
 Participants 
We conducted individual sessions with 63 individuals concurrently enrolled in either first 
or second semester introductory algebra-based physics course.  Students were invited via an 
email sent to all students enrolled in the course and were paid $10 for participation.  We 
collected data over two semesters, but ensured that students had covered relevant topics in their 
physics course before recruiting them to volunteer in our study. We invited students from the 
same courses to participate both semesters. We also ensured that each student only participated 
once.   
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 Materials 
The materials consisted of four sets of related conceptual introductory physics problems 
in which an accompanying diagram was necessary to answer the problem. These problems have 
been previously studied in the work presented in Chapter 3 and a complete description of the 
PER literature which describes them is available there. Three of the six problems discussed in 
Chapter 3 dealt with kinematics graphs. We choose to use one of these kinematic graph questions 
as well as the three other questions for a total of four problems in the current study. We refer to 
these problems as the Roller Coaster, Ball, Skier, and Graph problems (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 Four “initial” problems taken from Madsen et. al. 2012 and used in current 
study. Shown from top to bottom are the “Roller Coaster”, “Ball”, “Skier”, and “Graph” 
problems. 
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For those in the “cued” condition, dynamic visual cues were overlaid on the problem 
diagram. The cues used in this study were a combination of integration and selection cues (de 
Koning et al., 2009). The visual cues were designed to mimic the eye movements of those who 
answered the same problems correctly in our previous study described in Chapter 3. There was a 
large variation in eye movements from one individual to another while viewing the diagrams in 
these physics problems, so the visual cues could not mimic the eye movements of correct solvers 
exactly.  Instead, video playback of the correct solvers’ eye movements was viewed repeatedly 
and special attention was paid to the eye movements in and around the relevant area of interest.  
Similarities between participants were observed, and visual cues were modeled after these 
patterns. 
Cues on all four problem sets were intended to prompt selection and integration of 
expert-like elements in the problem diagrams. On the “roller coaster” problem, cues moved 
between the roller coaster carts to help students compare the heights of the roller coasters (Figure 
4.2). The relationship between heights of the roller coasters is needed to determine the potential 
energy of each at the beginning and end of the path and then relate this to the amount of kinetic 
energy and finally the speed. Cues helped participants to select the roller coaster carts and not 
attend to the shape of the roller coaster tracks, which is the most commonly used feature when 
giving an incorrect answer. They also aimed to help participants integrate the roller coaster carts, 
which were spatially separated, so they could compare the heights of the initial and final carts.  
On the “ball” problem, the cues aimed to help the students compare the distances 
between balls during the same time period (integration), for example comparing the distance 
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between the balls on track A and track B between one and two seconds. The balls on tracks A 
and B have the same speed when the balls have moved the same distance in the same one-second 
time interval. The cues were also intended to help the students select distances between 
successive balls and not compare the positions of the balls at the same time, as those who give an 
incorrect answer often do.  
On the “skier” problem, the cues were designed to help the student compare the heights 
of each slope (integration). The height of each slope is directly related to the change in potential 
energy. They were also designed to help the students to select the height and ignore the steepness 
of each slope, which is commonly used when giving a wrong answer.  
On the “graph” problem, the cues aimed to help the students judge the slope of the curved 
line at several points and compare this to the slope of the straight line (integration). The speed of 
the two objects is the same when the slope of the two lines is the same. They were also intended 
to help the solvers attend to the slopes of the lines and not the points where the lines cross 
(selection). At the crossing points, the two objects have the same position, but not the same 
speed, and students often confuse these two quantities.  
 
Figure 4.2 Roller coaster “similar” problem used in study with visual cues overlaid. The 
blue dots are the visual cues and the numbers in italics show sequence of animated cues 
(the numbers were not seen by study participants). 
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Within each problem set, there was an “initial” problem, four “similar” problems, and a 
“transfer” problem.  All problems were open-ended and contained a diagram which one had to 
use in order to answer the problem. The “similar” problems in each set had the same problem 
statement as the initial problem and the same surface features. The “novice-like” area of the 
diagram for each was manipulated in a way that would change the answer one would give if 
answering based on a novice-like conception. For example, in the similar problem set shown in 
Figure 4.3, the number and depth of bumps on the roller coaster track and horizontal distance 
between carts were varied. If a student uses the features of the track to determine the speed of the 
carts, their answer would be different for each of these problems. The transfer problem in each 
problem set tested the same concept as the initial and similar problems, though the surface 
features were different. For example, the roller coaster transfer problem shown in Figure 4.4 
contains two tracks with different start and end heights. Now the student must reason about the 
potential and kinetic energy of tracks with the same difference in height.  
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Figure 4.3 Example of four “similar” problems used in the “roller coaster” problem set in 
the study. 
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Figure 4.4 Example of a transfer problem used in the “roller coaster” problem set in the 
study. 
 
 Study Design and Procedure 
To ensure that the participants had sufficient prerequisite knowledge of the concepts 
tested in the study problems, each participant completed a pre-test, which consisted of four open-
ended questions gauging their understanding of speed and potential energy. Participants took part 
in individual sessions lasting between 30 and 60 minutes.  They were first given an explanation 
of what to expect and the eye tracker was calibrated.  Next, participants were instructed to spend 
as much time as needed on each question and answer with a verbal explanation of their reasoning 
when ready.  Participants in the cued condition were told that colored shapes may appear on 
some of the problems and when these appeared, they should follow them with their eyes.  No 
further information about the purpose of the cues was given to participants.  
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Each participant was randomly assigned to the “cued” condition or the “non-cued” 
condition. Equal numbers of participants were assigned to each condition. The research design is 
shown in Figure 4.5. First, students answered the initial problem to demonstrate their current 
level of understanding. If they answered incorrectly, they saw a series of “similar” problems, 
which contained the same problem statement as the initial problem, tested the same concept, and 
contained a diagram with similar surface features.  When the student answered a similar problem 
correctly, they saw the transfer problem.  This process continued until a maximum of four 
similar problems had been viewed by the participant, after which the participant was presented 
the transfer problem regardless of whether he/she answered the similar problem correctly or 
incorrectly. All participants viewed the four sets of problems in the same order. 
 
Figure 4.5 Flow chart showing how the initial problem, similar problems, and transfer 
problems were administered to students in each of four problem sets. 
 
 
Whenever a student was ready to provide an answer and explanation for a problem, they 
indicated this by pressing any key on a keyboard, at which point the problem displayed on the 
computer would become slightly smaller in size (this was so that the student knew they had 
successfully pressed a key).  The participants then explained their answer and reasoning to the 
experimenter and were able to point to areas on the computer screen if necessary.  The 
experimenter used a pre-defined rubric to determine if the given answer and explanation were 
correct or incorrect.  If the answer and/or reasoning were vague, the experimenter would ask for 
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clarification.  Once the experimenter had sufficient information to determine the correctness of 
the answer, the experiment would proceed.   
Participants in the cued condition saw moving colored shapes overlaid on the similar 
problems.  Moving colored shapes were used because color and motion have been found to be 
the most predictive of attentional selection because of their high perceptual salience (Carmi & 
Itti, 2006).  The cues used for the roller coaster problem are shown in Figure 4.2 and those for 
the ball, skier, and graph problems are shown in Appendix B.  Each colored shape appeared four 
seconds after the problem was presented to give the participant time to read the problem 
statement (although the problem statement for each similar problem was the same). The cues 
then appeared for 500 ms at 12 positions in the diagram for a total cueing time of six seconds. 
This six second time period was chosen as we modeled many aspects of our study after Thomas 
and Lleras’ (2007) successful cueing work, in which visual cues were shown for four seconds. 
After the cues ended, participants could spend as much time as they wanted on the problem. 
Participants’ verbal explanations and gestures were recorded with a Flip video 
camcorder. 
 Analysis and Results 
Participants were only included in our analysis if they correctly answered pre-test 
questions demonstrating knowledge of the concepts tested in the study problems. The pre-tests 
were scored as correct or incorrect by one of the researchers.  When a participant’s answer was 
unclear, two researchers discussed the answer and agreed on a conclusion. There were cases 
where a participant did not demonstrate adequate understanding of one of the concepts tested, so 
their data for that concept were not included in this analysis. Further, we only included 
participants with usable eye movement data files. There were four participants whose eye 
tracking data files became corrupted and could not be used. 
 Improvements to Problem Solving Performance with Visual Cues 
We first investigated the problem solving performance of participants by comparing how 
often those in the cued and non-cued condition who had answered the initial problem incorrectly 
answered one of the similar problems correctly. It is necessary to only look at the sub-group of 
students who answered the initial problem incorrectly, because those who gave the correct 
answer and reasoning would not benefit from the cues. We first compared the aggregate number 
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of participants in the cued and non-cued conditions who gave an incorrect answer on the initial 
problem and then gave a correct answer and explanation on any of the four similar problems. 
Fisher’s Exact Test (Fisher, 1922) was employed to test the significance of the difference 
between the cued and non-cued condition in the proportion of students who correctly answered a 
similar problem.  Fisher’s Exact Test is used with categorical data, which is encountered when 
participants are classified in two different ways, and small sample sizes.  In our case, the two 
different ways of classification are as follows:  1) whether a participant belongs to the cued or 
non-cued condition or 2) whether a participant did or did not correctly answer a similar problem 
(after answering the initial problem incorrectly).  Fisher’s Exact Test examines whether students 
in one condition are more likely to change to answer a similar problem correctly than students in 
the other condition on the same problem set. We found a significant effect of cueing when 
looking at the data for all problems (p=.004), so we then repeated Fishers Exact Test for each of 
the four problem sets, to determine which problem sets contributed to the positive effect of the 
cues. Results of Fisher’s Exact Test for each individual problem set as well as the phi coefficient 
representing the effect size are shown in Table 4.1. The total number of students included for 
each problem set is different and does not result in 63 total participants because we only included 
those who answered the initial problem incorrectly, who had satisfactorily answered the pre-test 
questions and who had usable eye-movement data files.  Figure 4.6 displays the percentage of 
students in each group who change to a correct answer on a similar problem set.  
 
Table 4.1 Summary of results of Fisher’s Exact Test comparing those who did and did not 
answer on a similar problem correctly for the cued and non-cued conditions. 
Problem 
Set Condition 
Answered 
Similar Problem 
Correctly 
Did Not Answer 
Similar Problem 
Correctly 
p 
Effect Size (Φ  
coefficient) 
Cued 6 14 Roller 
Coaster Non-Cued 0 19 .012* .42 
Cued 7 10 Ball Non-Cued 6 13 .228 - 
Cued 4 6 Skier 
Non-Cued 2 12 
.142 - 
Cued 6 16 Graph Non-Cued 3 25 .098 - 
 
  
65 
Figure 4.6 Comparison of participants in cued and non-cued conditions who gave the 
correct answer and reasoning on a similar problem. 
Percentage of Students Who Answered a Similar Problem Correctly 
 
 
We found a statistically greater number of participants in the cued condition answered a 
roller coaster similar problem correctly (p=  .012). This means that a mere six seconds of visual 
cueing for which the participants did not know the purpose resulted in significantly more 
students going from answering the roller coaster problem incorrectly to answering correctly and 
providing a scientifically correct explanation on a very similar problem. It is promising to find a 
difference using such a short intervention. We did not find significant differences on the ball, 
skier, or graph problems. Inferences on why this was the case will be reviewed in the Limitations 
and Future Work section. 
 Changes in Eye Movements on Similar Problems 
We next investigated how the visual cues influenced participants’ eye movements while 
viewing the similar problems. Prior to the experiment, participants in the cued group were told 
that they might see colored shapes appear on the screen and when they saw the shapes they 
should follow them with their eyes. Participants were not informed when they would see the 
shapes. Because of this, there were individual differences in how closely participants actually 
followed the moving colored shapes with their eyes. It may be that participants who did not 
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follow the shapes closely did not benefit as much from the visual cue as those who watched each 
segment of the cue. To investigate this possibility, we employed a scan path analysis using the 
ScanMatch algorithm (Cristino et al., 2010). We isolated participants’ eye movements while the 
cues were being shown for the first similar problem (since all cued participants saw this 
problem). We did this for participants in the cued condition and compared them to the scan path 
of the visual cues using the ScanMatch algorithm. We then compared the ScanMatch scores of 
those who had changed to a correct answer on a similar problem to those who had not. To do 
this, we employed the Kruskal–Wallis one-way analysis of variance in SPSS. This test is the 
non-parametric method to compare two or more independent groups and is the equivalent of the 
one-way ANOVA. This test was appropriate for our analysis since we had small group sizes 
which did not form a normal distribution. Average ScanMatch scores and standard error are 
reported in Table 4.2. We found a significant difference in ScanMatch scores between those who 
had answered a similar problem correctly and those who had not for the roller coaster problem 
only (H(3) = 9.939, p = .019). We did not find statistically significant differences on the ball, 
skier, or graph problems. This means that on the roller coaster problem, the participants who 
answered a similar problem correctly were following the visual cues more closely on similar 
problem 1. This suggests that on this problem there is a connection between how well one 
follows the visual cues with their eyes and if they change from an incorrect to correct answer and 
verbal explanation of their reasoning. We do not suggest a causal mechanism, but will explore 
this finding more in the conclusion.  
 
Table 4.2 ScanMatch scores for cued participants who did and did not answer a similar 
problem correctly. * indicates a significant difference. 
 ScanMatch Score (± Standard Error) 
Problem Changed to Correct Answer on Similar Problem 
Did Not Change to Correct 
Answer on Similar Problem 
Effect Size  
η2 
Roller 
Coaster* 
0.588 ± 0.031 
(n=6) 
0.379 ± 0.042 
(n=14) .47 
Ball 0.552 ± 0.046 (n=7) 
0.557 ± 0.044 
(n=10) - 
Skier 0.700 ± 0.037 (n=4) 
0.588 ± 0.058 
(n=6) - 
Graph  0.652 ± 0.034 (n=6) 
0.595 ± 0.028 
(n=16) - 
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 Problem Solving Performance on Transfer Problems 
Showing that visual cues have the potential to help students give the correct answer and 
reason about a problem is an encouraging result, but we will only have evidence that some kind 
of learning has occurred if students can subsequently answer a related question with no cues. To 
investigate this possibility, we analyzed the correctness of those in the cued and non-cued 
conditions on the transfer problem for each problem set. We once again used Fisher’s Exact Test 
to test for a difference in the number of students who had answered the transfer problem 
correctly in the cued and non-cued conditions for all problems. We found a significant effect of 
cueing (p=.027) so we repeated Fishers Exact Test for each individual problem set.   Results are 
shown in Table 4.3. Figure 4.7 displays the percentage of students in the cued and non-cued 
conditions who answered each transfer problem correctly. We found that a statistically greater 
number of participants in the cued condition answered the “ball” transfer problem correctly and 
gave the correct reasoning (p = .039). We also note that the raw percentage correct on the 
transfer problem was higher for those in the cue condition than the non-cued condition for all 
four problem sets.  
 
Table 4.3 Summary of results of Fisher’s Exact Test comparing those who did and did not 
answer the transfer problem correctly for the cued and non-cued conditions. * indicates a 
statistically significant difference 
Problem Set Condition 
# Participants 
Providing 
Correct Answer 
# Participants 
Providing 
Incorrect 
p 
Effect Size 
 (Φ  coefficient) 
Cued 3 17 Roller Coaster Non-Cued 1 18 
.263 - 
Cued 8 9 Ball Non-Cued 3 16 
*.039 .34 
Cued 2 7 Skier Non-Cued 2 12 
.370 - 
Cued 7 15 Graph 
Non-Cued 6 22 
.181 - 
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Figure 4.7 Comparison of participants in cued and non-cued conditions who gave the 
correct answer and reasoning on the transfer problem for each problem set in the study. 
Percentage of Students Answering Transfer Problem Correctly 
 
 Changes in Eye Movements on Transfer Problems 
The purpose of the visual cues was to redirect visual attention to relevant areas and help 
students integrate different important elements in a physics diagram. It may be that the brief 
visual cues did not help students answer the transfer problem correctly, although it may have 
influenced their visual attention. To test this idea, we completed an “areas of interest” (AOI) 
analysis on the eye movements on the transfer problem. To do this we defined two types of areas 
in each diagram, the “expert-like” and “novice-like” areas. The definitions for the “novice-like” 
areas of interest came from the individual think-aloud interviews and eye tracking analysis 
reported in our previous study described in Chapter 3. The “expert-like” areas were defined by 
expert raters and are also described in that chapter. For example, for the roller coaster problem, 
we defined the “expert-like” AOI around the roller coaster carts, as expert raters determined the 
relative heights of the carts are required to judge the final speeds of the carts on each track. We 
defined the “novice-like” AOI around the roller coaster tracks as we found through individual 
interviews and literature investigating a similar problem that those who answered incorrectly did 
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so using features of the track.  We mimic the AOI definitions used in this previous study in the 
current analysis for each problem set. The AOIs for the roller coaster problem are pictured in 
Figure 4.8.  The eye tracker used in this study had an average error of 0.5 degrees of visual 
angle, so the AOIs were defined to be 0.5 degrees of visual angle from the edge of the desired 
region or element in the diagram. After defining the “novice-like” and “expert-like” AOIs in the 
problem diagrams, we determined the amount of time each participant spent fixating in these 
areas and divided by the total time they spent fixating on the diagram to normalize for 
differences in viewing speeds. We then compared the percentage of time participants in the cued 
and non-cued condition spent in the “novice-like” and “expert-like” AOIs. If visual cues had  
positively influenced the eye movements of those in the cued condition, we would expect to see 
larger percentages of time in the “expert-like” AOIs than those in the non-cued condition. 
Further, we would expect to see smaller percentages of time in the “novice-like” areas than those 
in the non-cued condition. If cues had no influence on the eye movements of those in the cued 
condition, we would expect no differences in the percentage of time in either the “expert-like” or 
“novice-like” AOIs based on condition.  
 
Figure 4.8 Expert-like and novice-like definitions of areas of interest (AOI) for the roller 
coaster transfer problem. The expert-like AOIs are around the roller coaster carts while 
the novice-like AOIs are around the tracks. 
 
 
  
70 
We compared the percentage of time spent in the novice-like and expert-like AOIs using 
a one-way ANOVA with percentage of time in AOI as the dependent variable and cued or non-
cued condition as the independent variable for each transfer problem. We remind the reader that 
we only included the eye movements of those participants who had answered the initial problem 
incorrectly and had seen the similar problem(s). The results are displayed in Table 4.4 including 
the effect size using omega squared. For the roller coaster problem, we found that participants in 
the cued condition spent statistically higher percentage of fixation time in the expert-like AOI 
and smaller percentage in the novice-like AOI. We also found for the ball and skier problems, 
participants in the cued condition spent a smaller percentage of fixation time in the novice-like 
AOIs. This indicates that the cues helped participants in the cued condition allocate more visual 
attention to the expert-like area (on the roller coaster problem) which contain information needed 
to answer correctly, and allocate less visual attention to the novice-like areas (on the roller 
coaster, ball and skier problems) which contain visual information consistent with scientifically 
incorrect conceptions. So, seeing the visual cues influenced how participants viewed the transfer 
problems, but not how they answered them.  
 
Table 4.4 Mean percentage fixation time spent (± std err) on the transfer problems for expert-like 
and novice-like AOIs for participants in the cued and non-cued conditions. 
 Problem Set Cued Non-Cued 
ANOVA 
Results p ω
2 
Roller* 
Coaster 
18.5 ± 2.2 
(n=21) 
9.7± 1.7 
(n=19) F(1,38)=9.573 .004 .06 
Ball 28.4 ± 3.3 (n=17) 
21.1 ± 3.9 
(n=19) F(1,34)=2.022 .164 - 
Skier 0.5 ± 0.3 (n=9) 
1.0 ± 0.6 
(n=14) F(1,21)=.451 .509 - 
Expert-like 
AOI 
Graph 6.3 ± 1.0 (n=21) 
6.7 ± 1.4 
(n=28) F(1,48)=.039 .844 - 
Roller* 
Coaster 
18.0 ± 2.1 
(n=21) 
29.5 ± 3.1 
(n=19) F(1,38)=9.835 .003 .11 
Ball* 4.3 ± 1.4 
(n=17) 
10.9 ± 2.4 
(n=19) F(1,34)=5.372 .027 .021 
Skier* 18.2 ± 2.3 (n=9) 
49.0 ± 3.5 
(n=14) F(1,21)=42.105 <.001 .50 
Novice-like 
AOI 
Graph 8.0 ± 1.2 (n=21) 
11.6 ± 1.4 
(n=28) F(1,48)=3.427 .070 - 
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 Conclusions 
In this study we find some evidence that short duration, dynamic visual integration and 
selection cues improve students’ problem solving performance on introductory conceptual 
physics problems as participants were able to correctly answer and reason about problems they 
were previously unable to.  Of the four problem sets used, we found significantly more students 
changed to a correct answer after seeing the visual cues on the roller coaster problem. Through 
the lens of Representational Change Theory, this suggests that the cues may have helped the 
students’ overcome an impasse and mentally re-represent the problem so that productive 
concepts or pieces of knowledge could be retrieved from long term memory and applied. We did 
not find this difference on the other three problem sets.  
We also investigated how the dynamic visual cues influenced participants’ eye 
movements while viewing the cues. We looked for a relationship between how well each 
participant followed the visual cues with their eyes, and whether they had changed from an 
incorrect answer on the initial problem to a correct answer and reasoning on a similar problem. 
To do this we calculated similarity scores between their eye movement scan path and the path of 
the visual cues using the ScanMatch algorithm and compared these similarity scores between 
those who had and had not correctly answered a similar problem. We found that for the roller 
coaster problem, those who successfully answered and reasoned about a similar problem had 
higher similarity scores (ScanMatch scores). This means that these participants were following 
the cue more closely with their eyes. This suggests a link between how well participants attended 
to the visual cues and how helpful the cue was at implicitly influencing their reasoning about the 
problem. We did not find the same difference on the other three problems. One would expect that 
if the cues were ineffective at helping students answer a similar problem correctly we would not 
find a relationship between the effectiveness of the cue and how well the students followed it 
with their eyes. 
It is not enough that visual cues would help students answer a set of problems where the 
cues are visible. Visual cueing would be most educationally effective if after seeing visual cues 
repeated on several similar problems, students could then successfully answer and reason about 
related but different problems with no cues, which we have called a “transfer” problem in our 
study. We compared the correctness of answers and reasoning on the transfer problem associated 
with each of the four problem sets between those who had seen visual cues and those who had 
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not. We found a significant difference in transfer problem correctness between conditions for the 
ball problem, with a greater number of participants in the cued condition answering this problem 
correctly. We also found the raw percentages of correct answers were greater for those in the 
cued condition on all four problem sets. Thus, we find some evidence that repeatedly showing 
novices visual cues on related problems may help them form a productive mental representation 
on similar future problems viewed without cues.  
We also investigated how seeing the dynamic visual cues on similar problems may have 
influenced participants’ visual attention on the transfer problems. We compared the percentage 
of fixation time spent in “novice-like” and “expert-like” areas of interest between those in the 
cued and non-cued conditions on the transfer problems associated with all four problem sets. We 
found that on the roller coaster problem, participants in the cued condition spent a significantly 
greater percentage of time looking in the “expert-like” AOI and a significantly smaller 
percentage of time in the “novice-like” AOI, than those is the non-cued condition. We also found 
for the ball and skier problems, those in the cued condition spent a significantly smaller 
percentage of fixation time looking in the “novice-like” AOI. This suggests that seeing the cues 
on this problem has an influence on participants’ visual attention on subsequent un-cued 
problems and helps them to pay more attention to the expert-like elements (in one case) and less 
attention to the novice-like elements (in three of the four problem sets used). This is promising, 
as we know from previous work that those who answer a problem correctly spend more time 
looking at the “expert-like” areas of the problem and those who answer incorrectly spend more 
time looking at the “novice-like” areas. Helping participants look at helpful areas and ignore 
distracting areas when no visual cues are present could be a first step to helping them reason 
correctly about the problem.  
This work adds to the building body of research in physics education on the importance 
of visual attention in physics problem solving (Feil & Mestre, 2010; Rosengrant, Thomson, et 
al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010; Tai et al., 2006). As educators and researchers, we often overlook 
the way our students view visual representations in physics. This study provides some evidence 
that the way a student looks at a visual representation can influence their reasoning, especially 
when the representation contains relevant and irrelevant elements. In light of this, we should help 
students become mindful of the way they allocate their visual attention in physics problem 
solving and assessment. 
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Chapter 5 - Do Perceptually Salient Elements In Physics Problems 
Influence Students’ Eye Movements and Answers? 
 Introduction 
We have previously investigated the influence of perceptual salience on visual attention 
while solving introductory physics problems with diagrams by recording eye movements in our 
study described in Chapter 3. In that study, several limitations prevented conclusions as to 
whether participants’ eye movements were primarily influenced by bottom-up perceptual 
salience-driven processes or top-down novice-like knowledge-driven processes. The current 
study addresses these limitations. 
In our current study we extend and build on our previous work to investigate the effects 
of perceptual salience on students’ eye movements and answer patterns to introductory physics 
questions. We improve on our previous work described in Chapter 3 by manipulating the 
perceptual salience of “expert-like” and “novice-like” elements in problem diagrams. This allows 
us to ensure that the perceptually salient diagram elements and other elements of interest are 
spatially distinct. We have also expanded the number of problems used in the study.  In this 
study we test the following possibilities.  
From  Heckler’s (2011) work discussed in Chapter 1, it follows that initially, salient 
elements in the problem diagram capture learners’ attention via automatic perceptual processes. 
If these salient areas are plausibly relevant to the problem solution, students activate certain 
reasoning resources based on these elements. For instance, if the novice-like area is the most 
perceptually salient, participants’ will activate resources consistent with a novice-like conception 
and answer the question incorrectly. Conversely, if the expert-like areas are most perceptually 
salient, participants will activate scientifically correct resources and will answer the question 
correctly. When the novice-like and expert-like areas are equally salient, participants will answer 
either correctly or incorrectly in equal proportions.  In all of these cases, the underlying 
processes are automatic and salience driven.  Consequently, students’ answer patterns should be 
influenced by which area of the problem – novice-like or expert-like – is more salient.  
Another possibility, based on the work of Hegarty et al. (2010) discussed in Chapter 1, is 
that there will be an interaction between the effect of the perceptual salience on visual attention 
and physics knowledge. As shown by Hegarty et al.’s study, learners with scientifically correct 
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domain knowledge may exert stronger top-down influence on attention and be influenced less by 
perceptually salient diagram elements that learners who lack scientifically correct domain 
knowledge. 
A third option, consistent with the findings in Chapter 3, is that the visual salience of the 
various regions will have little if any impact on viewers’ attention or answers to physics 
problems.  Instead, using top-down knowledge, learners will ignore visual salience and focus on 
the area of the figure consistent with their understanding of the relevant (or irrelevant) physics 
concepts.  
The current study tests the aforementioned hypotheses. In sum, we address Research 
Question 3: “Does perceptual salience of diagram elements influence students’ answer choices 
and eye movements on physics problems which contain the relevant information in a diagram?” 
If we find that perceptual salience does influence students’ answers and attention, we will go on 
to investigate the related research question,  “How should we account for this when creating 
instructional materials containing diagrams or animations? 
 
 Method 
 Participants 
We conducted individual interview sessions with 60 students in second-semester algebra-
based physics, “General Physics 2” (GP2), or in calculus-based physics, “Engineering Physics 2” 
(EP2).  Students were invited to participate in the study via an email sent to all students enrolled 
in either course and were paid $20 for their participation.  
 Materials 
The materials consisted of 15 introductory physics problems in which an accompanying 
diagram was necessary to answer the problem. Similar to the problems used in the studies 
described in chapters 3 and 4, the problems used in this study have features that students use to 
produce incorrect answers. We refer to these areas as “novice-like” areas of the diagram. The 
problem diagrams also contained areas that one needs to attend to in order to answer the question 
correctly. We refer to these areas as “expert-like” areas. The “expert-like” areas are identified in 
Table C.1 and C.2 (Appendix C) and the “novice-like” areas are identified in Table C.1 and C.2 
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(Appendix C).  Table 5.1 lists the previously studied questions from the PER literature, on which 
our study questions were based. 
There are several ways that perceptual salience can be manipulated. In the current study 
we manipulate perceptual salience by manipulating luminance contrast because it is one of the 
simplest aspects of a diagram to change, while leaving other aspects of the figure, such as the 
thickness of lines, and size of shapes in the diagrams unchanged. Further, Harding and Bloj 
(2010) found that of contrast defined in terms of differences in luminance, color, spatial 
frequency, and orientation, only changes in the luminance contrast of elements in a natural scene 
had measurable effects on eye movements. Thus, we manipulated the perceptual salience of the 
novice-like and expert-like areas of the diagrams by altering their luminance contrast, that is 
their relative “darkness.”  
By changing the luminance contrast of diagram elements, we produced three versions of 
each problem: The perceptually salient area was either located at the novice-like area, the expert-
like area, or both areas were approximately equally salient. For example in Figure 5.1, to answer 
correctly, one needs to find the point on the line where the slope is zero, which is where the 
speed of the object is zero (i.e., the expert-like area). The most common incorrect answer for this 
problem is the point where the line crosses the x-axis and the distance is zero (i.e., the novice-
like area).  
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Figure 5.1 Three versions of a study problem. (Top diagram) Expert-like area most 
perceptually salient. (Middle diagram) Novice-like area most perceptually salient. (Bottom 
diagram) Expert and novice-like areas have equal levels of salience.  
When is the speed of the object shown in the graph 
zero? 
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Heckler (2011) explains that the term “salience” is used in many contexts and may be 
defined operationally in a variety of ways, though it is important to use the term consistently. He 
offers an example of an informal definition of salience as “the quality of standing out or being 
more noticeable compared to other co-occurring dimensions” and an example of a more formal 
definition as “a quality of a cue or dimension that, separate from relative predictiveness, affects 
attention to and the learning of a cue relative to other present cues.” He also provides an example 
of an operational definition of the salient dimension as “the one that attracts the most attention, 
as measured by eye tracking,” though he does not specify a precise definition for salience used in 
his work. We operationally defined perceptual salience using Walther’s (2006) model which is 
based on Itti and Koch’s (2000) widely used and accepted model. Further, Walther’s model is 
implemented in an easy to use and freely available Matlab toolbox called the Saliency Toolbox 
(Walther, 2006).  The model employs an algorithm that determines a numerical value for relative 
perceptual salience. This was important for our study, because it provided a metric to determine 
the appropriateness of our manipulations of the diagram elements.  The Saliency Toolbox 
determines the relative perceptual salience of different elements in the diagram based on 
contrasts in color, orientation, and luminance and outputs a numerical value representing the 
degree of perceptual salience of each element. In our study, the diagrams were black and white 
so the algorithm used contrasts in orientation and luminance to calculate salience. The algorithm 
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then employs a “winner takes all” model and determines the order in which the diagram elements 
will be attended to. To ensure that the appropriate area(s) in each diagram were indeed the most 
perceptually salient, we manipulated the luminance contrast until the desired areas were 
predicted by the algorithm to be the first to be attended to.  
When manipulating the problem diagrams, we took care to ensure that the peak salience 
values of elements in the desired areas (when there was more than one element) were very 
similar and much greater than the peak salience values of elements in the undesired areas. Thus, 
the percent difference in perceptual salience values between elements in the desired areas was 
less than 25%. Further, the percent difference in perceptual salience value between elements in 
the desired areas and those in the undesired areas was greater than 75%.   
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Table 5.1 Sources of questions used in study. Question description as used in original study 
and percentage of correct and incorrect student responses are listed for each question. 
Superscript numeral indicates source data was taken from in the case that there are several 
sources listed.  
Question Description Source 
Related 
Problem in 
Current 
Study 
% Correctness and Reasoning 
160% (correct) when slopes are 
the same 
 40% (incorrect) when lines 
cross 
When are the two objects moving 
with the same speed? 
(Heckler, 
2011)1; (Madsen 
et al., 2012)2; 
(Trowbridge & 
McDermott, 
1980) 
 
A 273% (correct) when lines have 
the same slope 
 27% (incorrect) when lines 
cross. 
When is the speed of the object 
shown in the graph zero? 
(Madsen et al., 
2012) B 
70% (correct) where slope is 
zero 
30% (incorrect) point where 
line crosses x-axis  
If frictional effects can be ignored, 
how does the final speed of roller 
coaster cart A compare to the final 
speed of roller coaster cart B, if the 
mass of the carts is the same and 
they both start at rest? 
(Madsen et al., 
2012)1; 
(Trowbridge & 
McDermott, 
1980) 
C 
154% (correct) final speed is the  
same because of same heights 
45 % (incorrect) final speed is  
different because of features of 
the  track 
Rank the changes in potential 
energy during the skiers descent 
down each slope from greatest to 
least. 
(Madsen et al., 
2012) 
D 
46% (correct) potential energy 
down each slope is the same 
55% (incorrect) potential 
energy depends on the slope 
Two frictionless slides are shaped 
differently but start at the same 
height, H, and end at the same 
level shown below. You and your 
friend, who has the same weight as 
you, slide down from the top on 
different slides starting from rest. 
Which of the following statements 
best describes who has a larger 
speed at the bottom? 
(Singh & 
Rosengrant, 
2003) 
E 
50% (correct) same speed at the 
bottom of the slide 
50% (incorrect) different speeds 
depending on the shape of the 
slide.  
At which point is the electric field 
greater, A or B? 
(Heckler, 2011) 
F 
>40% (correct) capacitor with 
greater difference in voltage. 
50% (incorrect) capacitor with 
greater central voltage 
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Which pendulum has a longer 
period? 
(Heckler, 2011) 
G 
70% (correct) both pendulums 
have equal periods  
30% (incorrect) longer 
pendulum 
Two forces are applied in opposite 
directions at the ends of a rod. 
What is the net torque? 
(Rimoldini & 
Singh, 2005)1; 
(Heckler, 2011) 
H 1(no exact values given) Many 
students considered torque and 
force as equivalent concepts. 
How do the forces compare upon 
collision? 
(Brown, 1989) 
I 
18% (correct) that forces are 
equal upon collision 
82% (incorrect) that forces are 
different based on features of 
the objects colliding and 
relative speeds 
At which point on the graph is the 
object turning around? 
(Madsen et al., 
2012) 
J 
58% (correct) point where slope 
changes from positive to 
negative 
32% (incorrect) point where 
line crosses x-axis 
Two balls roll along the path show. 
The position of the balls is shown 
at equal time intervals of one 
second. When does Ball B have 
the same speed as Ball A? 
(Madsen et al., 
2012) 
K 
65% (correct) when balls have 
traveled equal distance in one 
second 
35% (incorrect) when balls are 
at the same position at the same 
time 
At what time is the car moving 
faster? 
(Heckler, 2011) 
L 
70% (correct) when the slope is 
greater 
30% (incorrect) when the value 
of the point on the y-axis is 
greater 
Which trajectory has a longer time 
of flight? 
(Heckler, 2011) M 25% (correct) taller trajectory,  75% (incorrect) wider trajectory 
Two tanks are being filled by 
separate water hoses. Included is a 
graph representing the water in 
each tank as time goes on. Which 
tank is filling faster at a given 
time? 
(Allain, 2001) 
N 
83% (correct) when the slope is 
greater 
17% (incorrect) when the value 
of the point on the y-axis is 
greater 
Which ball wins the race? (Thaden-Koch, 
2003); (Leonard 
& Gerace, 1996) O 
15% (correct) one ball wins due 
to initial slope 
85% (incorrect) balls tie due to 
energy conservation and same 
initial and final positions 
 Design 
We used an incomplete block design in which each participant viewed all 15 problems in 
a randomized order. They viewed 5 problems with the “expert-like” area most perceptually 
salient, 5 problems with the “novice-like” area most salient and 5 problems with the expert and 
novice-like areas of approximately equal salience. Assignment of saliency levels to problems 
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was counter-balanced across subjects, and the experiment was designed so that 20 subjects 
viewed each manipulation of each problem, though an error occurred and two participants 
viewed the same set of problems in the same order. This resulted in a slight imbalance in our 
blocks.  
 Procedure 
Each participant took part in an individual session, which lasted between 20 and 45 
minutes. At the beginning of the session, participants were given a short explanation of the goal 
of the session and the purpose of the research. After calibrating the eye tracking system, if the 
validation’s mean error was ≤ 0.50° of visual angle, the experiment began, otherwise the 
calibration and validation was repeated until successful. Next, the participant was instructed to 
silently answer 15 questions with diagrams while their eye movements were recorded. The 
problem statement and diagram appeared on different computer screens to prevent the perceptual 
salience of the text from interfering with the diagram. Participants were allowed to toggle 
between the text and diagram as often as needed using a game pad. They signaled that they were 
ready to answer using the game pad, and then indicated their answer on a paper copy of the 
diagram. Between questions, a calibration drift correction procedure was done to ensure proper 
calibration throughout the experiment. This procedure required the participant to fixate on a 
small white dot in the middle of a gray screen and press a key. Pressing the key caused the screen 
to advance to the next problem when the participant’s fixation was within a pre-defined invisible 
square with an area of 1° squared around the white dot. Participants were given unlimited time to 
answer the questions.  
 Analysis and Results 
 Correctness of Answers 
We first determined how our salience manipulation influenced the correctness of 
participants’ answers for each problem. To this end, we used a generalized linear mixed model 
with a binary distribution and implemented the model using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS. 
We considered the salience manipulation and problem number as fixed factors and the subject as 
a random factor. The correctness of answer was the dependent variable. We found no main effect 
of the salience manipulation on correctness (F(2,796) = 2.21, p = .11) indicating that answer 
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correctness was not influenced by which diagram element was made most salient. Specifically, 
as shown in Figure 5.2, there were no significant differences in learners’ correctness when they 
viewed problem diagrams in which the salient area was in the expert area, the novice area¸ or the 
equally salient conditions. Table 5.2 shows the same data broken out by individual problems. 
Since participants viewed problems in a randomized order, problems in Table 5.2 are assigned a 
letter instead of a number for identification purposes. As suggested by Table 5.2, we found a 
significant main effect for problem (F(14, 796) = 10.53, p < .001) which means that correctness 
varied by problem. This is not surprising, as we would expect that the problems would likely 
vary somewhat in difficulty. Importantly, however, there was no significant interaction between 
problem and saliency manipulation. 
 
Table 5.2 Average correctness of problems by salience manipulation given in percentage.   
 Average Correctness (± Standard Error) 
Problem Expert-Like Manipulation 
Novice-Like 
Manipulation 
Equal Salience 
Manipulation 
A 45.0 ± 11.4 65.0 ± 10.9 40.0 ± 11.2 
B 60.0 ± 11.2 50.0 ± 11.5 55.0 ± 11.4 
C 35.0 ± 10.9 55.0 ± 11.4 50.0 ± 11.5 
D 10.0 ± 6.9 19.0 ± 8.8 26.3 ± 10.4 
E 55.0 ± 11.4 40.0 ± 11.2 55.0 ± 11.4 
F 40.0 ± 11.2 55.0 ± 11.4 60.0 ± 11.2 
G 80.0 ± 9.2 85.0 ± 8.2 95.0 ± 5.0 
H 80.0 ± 9.2 75.0 ± 9.9 90.0 ± 6.9 
I 14.3 ± 7.8 21.0 ± 9.6 10.0 ± 6.9 
J 65.0 ± 10.9 40.0 ± 11.2 60.0 ± 11.2 
K 25.0 ± 11.9 40.0 ± 11.2 50.0 ± 11.5 
L 80.0 ± 9.2 80.0 ± 9.2 90.0 ± 6.9 
M 35.0 ± 10.9 55.0 ± 11.4 65.0 ± 10.9 
N 84.2 ± 8.6 76.2 ± 9.2 70.0 ± 10.8 
O 40.0 ± 11.2 25.0 ± 9.9 20.0 ± 9.2 
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Figure 5.2 Problem accuracy as a function of salience manipulation.  Error bars represent 
standard error.  
Average Percentage Correct for All Problems Across Each  
Salience Manipulation 
 
 
Prior knowledge may affect the degree to which the salience manipulation influences the 
correctness of students’ answers (Hegarty et al., 2010). For example, students with strong 
content knowledge may be less influenced by the salience manipulations. To investigate this 
possibility, we accessed prior semester physics test scores for two different subsets of study 
participants; those who had taken General Physics 1 (GP1) or Engineering Physics 1 (EP1) in the 
previous semester. We conducted additional 3 x 2 factorial ANOVAs for these two subsets of 
students. We took the average of the participants’ previous semester physics test scores and 
determined the students in the top and bottom third of the average test score distribution. The top 
and bottom third of the test score distribution were used as two levels of the “previous semester 
test score” variable. In the ANOVA, the salience manipulation was used as the within-subjects 
variable, previous semester mean test score (top and bottom third) as a between-subjects 
variable, and mean correctness of answer on the study problems as the dependent variable. We 
found no main effect of salience manipulation on correctness for either those who had previously 
taken GP1 (F(2.28) = 2.11, p = .141) or  EP1 (F(2.18) = .141, p = .87). This indicates that, 
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contrary to the finding presented in Hegarty et al.’s (2010) work, the salience manipulations did 
not influence problem correctness for either of these two subsets of students. Additionally we 
found no interaction between salience manipulation and previous semester mean test scores for 
either the GP1 group (F(2,28) = 1.89, p = .17) or EP1 group (F(2,18) = 1.26, p= . 31).  Again, 
contrary to the above-mentioned hypothesis, this means that the influence of the salience 
manipulation on how well students did on the physics problems did not differ as a function of 
their prior physics knowledge.  
We found a main effect of previous semester test scores on correctness for the EP1 
students (F(1,9) = 5.36, p = .048). This means that EP1 students who were in the top third of the 
average previous semester test score distribution answered the problems in our study more 
correctly than those in the bottom third of the previous semester’s mean test score range. This 
finding suggests that our problems are indeed sensitive to learners’ pre-existing differences in 
physics knowledge and application, and thus indicates that the problems have criterion validity 
as a measure of physics understanding.  
Overall, we found that the salience manipulation did not influence the correctness of 
participants’ answers when considering all participants. Additionally, we found the same null 
result for the subsets of participants previously enrolled in GP1 and EP1. We also found that for 
these subsets of students, the salience manipulation did not interact with students’ pre-existing 
knowledge and application of physics concepts, as measured by their previous semester physics 
test scores.  However, we did find that our physics problems were sensitive to differences in 
prior physics knowledge, and thus the lack of effect of saliency on correctness cannot be 
attributed to a lack of sensitivity of our dependent measure.  
 Dwell Time In Areas Of Interest for the First Two Seconds 
We were also interested in determining how the salience manipulation influenced 
students’ eye movements. To do this we conducted an area of interest analysis. The expert areas 
of interest (EXAOI) are those portions of the diagram that one needs to attend to in order to 
answer the problem correctly. The expert areas were determined by three independent raters, one 
physics professor, and two PhD students in physics who determined the area(s) in each problem 
which contained visual information necessary to answer the problem correctly (see Table 5.1). 
The novice-like areas of interest (NVAOI) are the portions of the diagram consistent with the 
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most common incorrect answer for each problem as documented in the literature (See Table 5.1). 
For example in Figure 5.3 (Top Left), to correctly answer the question, “When is the speed of the 
object shown in the graph zero?” one needs to find the area where the slope of the line is zero, 
which is where the speed of the object is zero (EXAOI). The most common incorrect answer for 
this problem is the point where the line crosses the x-axis and the distance is zero (NVAOI). To 
correctly answer the question, “Which pendulum takes longer to swing back and forth once?” 
(Figure 5.3, Top Right), one must compare the lengths of the pendulums shown (EXAOI). It has 
been shown that the most common wrong answer to this question involves comparing the masses 
on each pendulum (NVAOI). The eye tracker used in this study had an average error of 0.5 
degrees of visual angle, so the AOIs were defined to be 0.5 degrees of visual angle from the edge 
of the desired region in the diagram.  
Since it has been shown that perceptual salience has its strongest effect during the first 
two seconds of viewing (Carmi & Itti, 2006). Thus, we determined the percentage of time in the 
first two seconds each participant fixated in each AOI for each salience manipulation. We 
wanted to compare eye movements across problems, so it was also necessary to take the physical 
area of each AOI into account. To do this, we divided the fixation time in the AOI as percentage 
of two seconds by the percentage of area (in pixels2). This produced a new dependent variable, 
percentage of total fixation time divided by the percentage of total area, which we will call 
PT/PA (also known as the domain relative ratio (Fletcher-Watson, Findlay, Leekam, & Benson, 
2008)). 
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Figure 5.3 The expert (EX) and novice (NV) areas of interest (AOIs) overlaid on several 
problems used in study. 
When is the speed of the object shown in 
the graph zero? (Problem B)  
Which pendulum takes longer to swing back and 
forth once? (Problem G) 
 
 
The motion of a car is represented in the 
graph. At which time is the car moving 
faster? (Problem L) 
Between which pair of parallel plates is the 
electric field greater? (Problem F) 
 
 
 
We used a generalized linear mixed model with a normal distribution and implemented 
the model using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS. We considered the salience manipulation and 
problem number as fixed factors and the subject as a random factor. The PT/PA was the 
dependent variable. We found significant two way interactions interaction between AOI type and 
salience manipulation (F(2,855) = 3.90, p = .021) and AOI type and problem (F(14,855) = 34.65, 
p < .001). The interaction between AOI type and salience manipulation indicates that the PT/PA 
across all problems is different for some combinations of salience manipulation and AOI types. 
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        NVAOI 
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To determine precisely where these differences lie, we completed simple effect pair wise 
comparisons using the Tukey-Kramer adjustment for each manipulation and AOI type and 
looked at the mean values of PT/PA to determine the direction of any differences found. 
Comparison of PT/PA across AOIs for a given salience manipulation is shown in Table 5.3. We 
notice that the raw values of PT/PA are greater for the NVAOI in all three salience 
manipulations. On the novice-like salience manipulation, participants had a significantly higher 
PT/PA in the NVAOI than in the EXAOI (p = .011). On the equal salience manipulation, we 
again found participants had a higher PT/PA in the NVAOI than in the EXAOI (p < .001).  
Overall this eye movement analysis indicates that participants spend significantly more PT/PA in 
the NVAOI on two of the three salience manipulations, though the raw PT/PA is greater in the 
NVAOI for all three salience manipulations. This indicates that participants look more at the 
novice-like area whether or not it is the most salient. This results points to top-down cognitive 
processes driving attention, as opposed to automatic bottom-up perceptual processes because 
participants visual attention was not influenced by the salience manipulations, as we predict 
would happen if automatic perceptual processes were dominant. 
 
Table 5.3 PT/PA, standard error and significant results of pair-wise comparisons for 
significant interaction between area and manipulation for AOI analysis. 
Significant 
Interaction 
Manipulation 
Type 
AOI 
Type PT/PA 
Std. 
Error 
Significant Results of 
Pairwise Comparisons 
EXAOI 15.15 2.02 
EX Man. 
NVAOI 20.59 2.02 
None 
EXAOI 17.44 2.02 
NV Man. 
NVAOI 26.30 2.02 
NVAOI > EXAOI, 
p=.011 
EXAOI 13.65 2.02 
Area*Man. 
EQ Man. 
NVAOI 29.39 2.02 
NVAOI > EXAOI, 
p<.001 
 Scan Path Analysis 
The area of interest analysis described above compared the percentage of time 
participants spent fixating in pre-defined areas. Using this method, we found that the raw PT/PA 
was higher in the NVAOI in all three salience manipulations and significantly higher in the 
novice and equal salience manipulations. This seems to indicate that the salience manipulation 
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does not have a strong influence on how participants view the problem diagrams in the first two 
seconds. Another way to investigate the effect of perceptual salience on eye movements without 
pre-defining areas is to look at both the spatial and temporal aspects of eye movement scan paths 
using a scan path analysis. We compared how closely the participants’ scan paths matched a 
predicted scan path produced by the Saliency Toolbox algorithm, which predicted where 
participants should look based on perceptual saliency of each image. Saliency Toolbox used 
contrasts in light intensity and orientation (e.g., of lines) to determine the order in which diagram 
elements would be fixated based on saliency. This algorithm assumes that when visual attention 
is primarily influenced by saliency, one’s attention first selects the location with highest salience, 
this location is then fixated on, and after the information there has been sufficiently processed, 
one’s attention moves to the next most salient spatial location. In this way, the algorithm 
produces an ordered list of x and y coordinates representing the saliency model’s predicted scan 
path for the first two seconds of each problem and salience manipulation. We found the average 
fixation durations for participants on each problem and salience manipulation and used these as 
the fixation durations for the predicted scan paths (for each problem and salience manipulation). 
In this way, we ensured the temporal aspects of the predicted scan paths were as similar to the 
actual eye movement scan paths as possible, and any differences we found were likely to be a 
result of looking at different elements of the diagrams in a different order. Since the effects of 
salience are the strongest during the first two seconds of viewing, we compared the first two 
seconds of the participants’ scan paths to a predicted scan path. 
We used the ScanMatch algorithm to compare the Saliency Toolbox predicted scan path 
with the participants’ scan paths for each problem in the salience manipulation the participants’ 
saw (congruent comparison). We also computed an incongruent ScanMatch score by comparing 
participants’ scan paths to the predicted scan paths of the salience manipulation they did not see. 
For example, if the participant viewed a problem with the expert-like area made most salient, we 
computed the ScanMatch score between their scan path and the predicted scan paths for the 
expert like manipulation (congruent comparison) as well as a score between their scan path and 
the novice-like salience manipulation, even though they did not view this manipulation 
(incongruent comparison) (Figure 5.4). We then compared the congruent and incongruent 
comparisons for each problem and manipulation (Table 5.4). A high ScanMatch score indicates 
that participants’ eye movements were very similar to the saliency model’s predicted scan path. 
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If perceptual salience of the problem diagrams influenced participants’ eye movements, the 
ScanMatch scores for the congruent comparisons should be much higher than for the incongruent 
comparisons.  
 
Figure 5.4 Example of scan-paths for expert-like salience manipulation (congruent for this 
image) in blue, novice-like salience manipulation (incongruent for this image) in red and a 
given participant’s scan path in green. 
 
 
We completed a mixed factorial 2 (salience manipulation) x 2 (comparison type) x 14 
(problem number) ANOVA with ScanMatch score as the dependent variable. Problem A was not 
included in this analysis because of a compatibility issue between the eye movement coordinates 
produced by Saliency Toolbox, the actual eye movements and the ScanMatch algorithm on this 
problem only.  Critically, if we find an effect of comparison type, this would indicate that the 
ScanMatch score of the congruent and incongruent comparisons are different. We found a 
significant three-way interaction between comparison type, salience manipulation and problem 
number (F(13, 1044) = 16.6, p  < .001). This means that the effect of comparison type on 
ScanMatch score varies by problem and salience manipulation. We then completed one-way 
ANOVAs for each problem and manipulation to determine where significant differences existed 
in the data. ScanMatch scores for expert-like and novice-like salience manipulations including 
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congruent and incongruent comparisons are shown in Table 5.4. Results of the one-way 
ANOVAs and effect sizes are shown in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.4 Scan Match scores for congruent and incongruent comparisons for each problem 
and salience manipulation. * indicates a significant difference between congruent and 
incongruent comparisons favoring the congruent condition; † indicates a significant 
difference favoring the incongruent condition. 
 ScanMatch Score ± Standard Error 
Problem Expert-Like Manipulation Novice-Like Manipulation 
 Congruent Comparison 
Incongruent 
Comparison 
Congruent 
Comparison 
Incongruent 
Comparison 
B 0.336 ± .014 0.330 ± .014 0.336 ± .014 0.350 ± .014 
C 0.151 ± .014 0.153 ± .014 0.150 ± .014 0.149 ± .014 
D 0.178 ± .016 0.148 ± .014 0.175 ± .014 0.184 ± .014 
E * 0.334 ± .014 0.246 ± .014 † 0.308 ± .014 0.382 ± .014 
F † 0.252 ± .014 0.294 ± .014 * 0.248 ± .014 0.180 ± .014 
G 0.292 ± .014 0.287 ± .014 0.284 ± .014 0.292 ± .014 
H 0.228 ± .014 0.223 ± .014 0.217 ± .014 0.229 ± .014 
I * 0.299 ± .014 0.245 ± .014 † 0.246 ± .014 0.273 ± .014 
J  0.287 ± .014 0.280 ± .014 0.265 ± .014 0.254 ± .014 
K † 0.217 ± .014 0.285 ± .014 * 0.312 ± .014 0.216 ± .014 
L 0.302 ± .014 0.312 ± .014 0.269 ± .014 0.283 ± .014 
M * 0.313 ± .015 0.219 ± .015 † 0.220  ± .014 0.323 ± .014 
N † 0.148 ± .014 0.294 ± .014 * 0.305 ± .014 0.172 ± .017 
O 0.257 ± .014 .209 ± .014 0.223 ± .015 0.261 ± .015 
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Table 5.5 Results of One-Way ANOVA Simple Effect Contrasts For ScanMatch Scores for 
congruent and incongruent comparisons of scan paths and effect size given with omega 
squared. “ –“ indicates no significant difference. 
Problem Expert-Like Manipulation Novice-Like Manipulation 
 ANOVA Results Effect Size (ω2) ANOVA Results 
Effect Size 
(ω2) 
B - - -  
C - - -  
D - - -  
E Congruent > Incongruent  F(1,39)=14.9, p<.001 .02 
Incongruent > Congruent  
F(1,39)=5.05, p=.03 .03 
F Incongruent > Congruent F(1,39)=5.30, p=.027 -.003 
Congruent > Incongruent 
F(1,39)=15.8, p<.001 .03 
G - - -  
H - - -  
I Congruent > Incongruent F(1,39)=14.6, p<.001 
 
.01 
Incongruent > Congruent 
F(1,39)=4.56, p=.034 <.001 
J - - -  
K Incongruent > Congruent F(1,39)=13.7, p=.001 .03 
Congruent > Incongruent 
F(1,39)=39.2, p<.001 .08 
L - - -  
M Congruent > Incongruent F(1,37)=13.4, p=.001 .06 
Incongruent > Congruent 
F(1,37)=35.4, p<.001 .09 
N Incongruent > Congruent F(1,37)=35.4, p<.001 .19 
Congruent > Incongruent 
F(1,33)=30.6, p<.001 .13 
O - - -  
 
We found significant difference for congruent and incongruent comparisons for six of 14 
problems tested. We did not find that the congruent comparison ScanMatch scores were 
consistently higher than the incongruent ScanMatch scores, which would have been evidence for 
perceptual salience guiding eye movements. Instead we found that the eye movements were 
more similar to one predicted scan-path, regardless of salience manipulation viewed. For 
example, in problem I, the congruent comparison is greater than the incongruent comparison for 
the expert-like salience manipulation, meaning the scan paths of participants were more similar 
to the predicted scan path for the expert-like salience manipulation (when they saw the expert-
like salience manipulation). Further, for the novice-like salience manipulation, the incongruent 
comparison was greater than the congruent comparison. This means that the scan paths of 
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participants were more similar to the predicted scan path of the expert-like salience 
manipulation, even though they viewed the novice-salience manipulation.  
We see the same pattern of scan paths being more similar to either the expert-like or novice-like 
predicted scan path, regardless of what salience manipulation the participants actually saw for all 
six of the 14 significant results described in Table 5.5. This means that the salience manipulation 
does not seem to have an influence on the scan paths of participants. This suggests that top-down 
cognitive processes instead of bottom-up processes are primarily influencing the participants’ 
eye movements.  
 Scan Path Analysis of Correct and Incorrect Responders 
In the previous analyses, we have investigated how salience manipulation influenced 
correctness of answers and eye movements separately and found no evidence to support the 
conjecture that salient and plausibly relevant diagram elements initially attract attention, 
participants do not consider other diagram elements and subsequently participants answer the 
questions based on the salient elements. One final way to test this conjecture is to look at 
correctness of answers and eye movements together in the same analysis. If eye movements are 
initially attracted to perceptually salient elements (as defined by the Saliency Toolbox 
algorithm), a participant should have a high ScanMatch score. If participants viewing a problem 
diagram with the novice-like areas most salient, attended to the novice-like areas and thought 
about concepts related to these areas, it would follow that they would answer incorrectly (and 
have a high scan match score on the novice-like salience manipulation). On the other hand, if 
they were viewing a problem diagram with the expert like area most salient, they would attend to 
helpful information, think about productive concepts and answer correctly (and have a high 
ScanMatch score on the expert-like salience manipulation).  
To this end, we look at how the congruent ScanMatch score predicted the correctness of a 
participant’s answer. We only included data for the expert-like and novice-like salience 
manipulations, as the equal salience manipulation would not lead to a correct or incorrect answer 
as both the novice-like and expert-like areas are salient. We used a generalized linear mixed 
model with a binary distribution and implemented the model using the GLIMMIX procedure in 
SAS. We considered the ScanMatch score and problem as fixed factors and the subject as a 
random factor. The correctness of answer was the dependent variable. We treated the data for the 
expert-like and novice-like salience manipulations separately. In our first implementation of the 
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model, we tested for a significant interaction between the ScanMatch score and the problem. We 
found no significant interaction for either the expert-like or novice-like salience manipulations. 
We then used the same generalized linear mixed model with a binary distribution, implemented 
using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS, to test for a significant effect of problem or ScanMatch 
score (but this time we did not include the interaction between these factors).  For both the 
expert-like and novice-like salience manipulations we found no significant effect of ScanMatch 
score (F(1,200) = < .001, p = .99 and F(1,206) = .18, p = .67 respectively). This tells us that the 
degree to which one closely follows the predicted scan path during the first two seconds of 
viewing the diagram does not predict correctness of answer. This is consistent with our previous 
findings that correctness of answer is not related to salience manipulation, and neither are eye 
movements. We found a significant effect of “problem” for both the expert-like and novice-like 
salience manipulations (F(14,200) = 4.13, p < .001 and F(14,206) = 3.03, p < .001, respectively). 
This means that ScanMatch scores varied by problem, which we expect but is not relevant to our 
research questions. 
 What Factors Influence Correctness of Answers and Eye Movements?  
We have just reported on an extensive analysis investigating how manipulation of the 
perceptual salience of expert-like and novice-like elements in a problem diagram might influence 
the correctness of participant’s answers and their eye movements. We repeatedly find no 
evidence to support Heckler’s conjecture about the role of perceptual salience in physics problem 
solving. We then ask ourselves, what factors influence participants to look at certain diagram 
elements and answer questions in the way they do? If it is not the bottom up information in 
features of the diagram that guide attention and then, in line with our third hypothesis discussed 
in the introduction, visual attention and answers must be governed by top-down process. In our 
previous study we found that participants’ who answered a physics problem correctly spent more 
time looking at thematically-relevant areas which contained information leading to the correct 
answers. We also found that those who answered incorrectly spent more time looking in areas 
consistent with a novice-like conceptions. This is evidence that it is the participants’ knowledge, 
correct or incorrect, which guides their attention and determines their answer. If we found the 
same pattern in the problems involved in the current study, we would have more evidence to 
support the claim that top-down cognitive processes guide problem solving on these problems.  
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We completed the same analysis as reported in Madsen et. al (2012). We determined the 
percentage of time participants spent in the expert-like and novice-like AOIs for the full problem 
period for each problem and salience manipulation. This differs from the AOI analysis discussed 
above which computed the percentage of time divided by the percentage of area (PT/PA) for the 
first two seconds of viewing. In the current analysis, we used the percentage of time (as opposed 
to the PT/PA) because we are comparing time spent fixating on EXAOIs between correct and 
incorrect responders (the same comparison will be made for NVAOIs), so we do not need to 
compare across areas of different size., therefore normalization by area is not necessary.  We 
look at the full problem period, as this is where we found effects of correctness in the previous 
work. We conducted a 2 x 15 mixed factorial ANOVA with percentage of time in each AOI type 
as the dependent variable and problem number and correctness of answer as independent 
variables were conducted for the EXAOI and NVAOI. We found a significant interaction 
between problem and correctness for both the expert-like and novice-like AOIs (F(14, 870) = 
2.983, p < .001 and F(14,870) = 3.770, p < .001, respectively). This means that the effect of 
correctness on percentage of time in each AOI type varies by problem. To determine which 
problems contain significant differences in proportion of time spent in each AOI type, we 
conducted one-way ANOVAs with percentage of time for EXAOI and NVAOIs as the 
dependent variable and correctness of answer as the independent variable. Results of one-way 
ANOVAs for each type of AOI for the full trial period as well as mean percentage of fixation 
time and standard error for the correct and incorrect responders for each question are also shown 
in Table 5.6. An asterisk indicates a significant difference at the α=.05 level. Six problems in our 
current study (problems A-D, J, and K) were also used in the Madsen et. al (2012) study, though 
in the previous study they were multiple choice questions whereas in the current there were no 
answer choices given. The significance of the differences between correct and incorrect solvers 
on these previously used problems is also reported in Table 5.6.  
For the EXAOI, the raw percentage of fixation time is greater for those who answer 
correctly for 12 out of 15 problems, and significantly greater for six of the 15 problems. For the 
NVAOI, for 11 of 15 problems, the raw percentage of fixation time is greater for those who 
answer incorrectly, significantly greater for 4 of 15 problems and nearly significantly greater (p 
= .067) for 1 of 15 problems. We notice that some of the problems have a high percentage of 
correct or incorrect responses. Because these problems were either too easy or too hard for these 
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students, they do not discriminate well between students who answered correctly or incorrectly. 
If we look only at those problems with average correctness between 30% and 70%, then there are 
five problems out of eight in which those who answered correctly spent a significantly higher 
percentage of time in the EXAOI and the raw percentage of time is greater on seven of these 
eight problems. There are five problems out of eight in which those who answered incorrectly 
spent a significantly or nearly significantly higher percentage of time in the NVAOI and the raw 
percentage of time is greater on seven of these eight problems. It should also be noted that for the 
six problems which were used in the previous Madsen et. al study, we found the same significant 
differences on five of five problems for the EXAOI and one additional significant difference on 
the remaining problem not found in the previous study. For the NVAOI, we found the same 
significant (or nearly) differences for four of the six problems. Thus, there is strong agreement 
between our previous and current results. This is important because the AOIs for problems used 
in both studies had been carefully determined based on interviews with students where we noted 
where students pointed to and what they talked about to come to incorrect answers. So it is on 
this subset of problems that we expect the best chance to find differences between correct and 
incorrect solvers, which we did.  
These significant differences and trends in percentage of fixation time in the EXAOI and 
NVAOI between those who answer the problem correctly and incorrectly in are evidence for top-
down cognitive processes primarily influencing visual attention in physics problems. The 
participants in our study viewed the problem diagrams with the important elements made more 
perceptually salient and despite these salience manipulations, there is still a difference in the 
percentage of time spent in the EXAOI and NVAOI based on correctness of answer. So we find 
evidence to suggest it is the way the participants utilize the domain knowledge they possess to 
reason and answer these physics problems that influences where they look as opposed to the 
salient features in the problem diagram itself. 
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Table 5.6 Mean percentage time spent ± std err and results of one-way ANOVA and effect 
size given with omega squared during entire problem period for expert and novice-like 
AOIs for participants who answered the question correctly/incorrectly.* indicates 
significant difference, p <.05 and † indicates a nearly significant difference. Significance of 
comparisons for the subset of problems used in Chapter 3 and the current study are also 
reported. 
AOI 
Type Prob. 
Answered  
Correctly 
Answered 
Incorrectly F p ω
2 % 
correct 
Previous 
Result from 
Chapter 3 
Expert-
like A* 
10.2 ± 1.7 
(n=30) 
1.8 ± 0.5 
(n=30) F(1,58)=21.51 <.001 
.09 50.0 significant 
 B* 7.3 ± 1.4 (n=33) 
1.5 ± 0.7 
(n=27) F(1,58=12.89 0.001 
.04 55.0 significant 
 C* 28.4 ± 2.8 (n=29) 
21.4 ±1.8 
(n=31) F(1,58)=4.56 0.039 
.06 48.3 not significant 
 D* 14.8 ± 3.5 (n=11) 
7.0 ± 0.8 
(n=49) F(1,58)=9.24 .004 
.04 18.3 significant 
 E 25.1 ± 2.6 (n=32) 
24.8 ± 2.6 
(n=28) F(1,58)=.005 0.944 
 53.3  
 F 28.8 ± 2.9 (n=31) 
26.0 ± 2.3 
(n=29) F(1,58)=.514 0.476 
 51.7  
 G 30.4 ± 2.8 (n=52) 
23.4 ± 5.8 
(n=8) F(1,58)=.887 .350 
 86.7  
 H 30.1 ± 2.4 (n=49) 
36.5 ± 5.1 
(n=11) F(1,58)=1.28 .263 
 81.7  
 I 9.3 ± 1.4 (n=9) 
10.1 ± 1.5 
(n=51) F(1,58)=.055 .100 
 15.0  
 J* 5.0 ± 1.1 (n=33) 
1.4 ± 0.7 
(n=27) F(1,58)=6.95 .011 
.004 55.0 significant 
 K* 44.9 ± 2.8 (n=23) 
25.5 ± 1.8 
(n=37) F(1,58)=37.67 <.001 
.52 38.3 significant 
 L 17.1 ± 2.4 (n=50) 
10.5 ± 4.2 
(n=10) F(1,58)=1.37 .247 
 83.3  
 M 4.3 ± 0.8 (n=31) 
5.2 ± 1.0 
(n=29) F(1,58)=.625 .432 
 51.7  
 N 15.1 ± 1.8 (n=46) 
14.9 ± 2.4 
(n=14) F(1,58)=.003 .953 
 76.7  
 O 25.3 ± 3.3 (n=17) 
27.2 ± 2.2 
(n=43) F(1,58)=.228 .635 
 28.3  
Novice-
Like A* 
6.9 ± 1.5 
(n=30) 
26.7 ± 3.6 
(n=30) F(1,58)=12.63 0.001 
.88 50.0 significant 
 B* 4.3 ± 0.9 (n=33) 
11.2 ± 2.1 
(n=27) F(1,58)=10.32 0.002 
.38 55.0 significant 
 C 13.9 ± 1.6 (n=29) 
16.8 ±1.9 
(n=31) F(1,58)=1.34 .253 
 48.3 significant 
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 D 27.1 ± 3.5 (n=11) 
32.4 ±2.5 
(n=49) F(1,58)=.896 0.348 
 18.3 significant 
 E 31.2 ± 2.3 (n=32) 
32.6 ± 2.8 
(n=28) F(1,58)=.143 0.707 
 53.3  
 F* 39.5 ± 2.4 (n=31) 
49.4 ± 1.8 
(n=29) F(1,58)=10.50 0.002 
.13 51.7  
 G 16.7 ± 1.9 (n=52) 
23.4 ± 5.0 
(n=8) F(1,58)=1.66 .203 
 86.7  
 H 26.6 ± 2.7 (n=49) 
23.8 ± 4.6 
(n=11) F(1,58)=.220 .641 
 81.7  
 I 53.7 ± 6.8 (n=9) 
65.5 ± 2.7 
(n=51) F(1,58)=2.80 .816 
 15.0  
 J† 9.0 ± 1.7 (n=33) 
14.7 ± 2.6 
(n=27) F(1,58)=3.63 .062 
 55.0 nearly significant 
 K* 18.5 ± 1.2 (n=23) 
32.4 ± 2.0 
(n=37) F(1,58)=27.32 <.001 
.26 38.3 significant 
 L 13.1 ± 1.5 (n=50) 
9.8 ± 1.6 
(n=10) F(1,58)=.941 .336 
 83.3  
 M 23.5 ± 2.2 (n=31) 
19.6 ± 2.3 
(n=29) F(1,58)=1.47 .231 
 51.7  
 N 21.9 ± 1.8 (n=46) 
15.7 ± 2.8 
(n=14) F(1,58)=3.01 .088 
 76.7  
 O 11.0 ± 2.6 (n=17) 
12.5 ± 1.6 
(n=43) F(1,58)=.221 .640 
 28.3  
 Conclusions 
It is important to understand whether and how perceptual salience of elements in physics 
problem diagrams influences students’ answers and eye movements.  We found that 
manipulation of perceptual salience via luminance contrast of expert and novice elements in a 
physics problem diagram did not influence the correctness of students’ answers. Additionally, 
based on Hegarty et. al’s (2010) work, we might expect that the effect of perceptual salience on 
attention and answer choices would decrease with increasing domain knowledge. When we 
factored in previous semester physics test grades, we still found no effect of this type of salience 
manipulation on correctness of answer.   
We also did not find an effect of our salience manipulation on the percentage of fixation 
time divided by percentage of area (PT/PA) for either the expert or novice AOIs. This indicates 
that attention was not drawn to perceptually salient portions (according to the Saliency Toolbox) 
of the diagram in the first two seconds of viewing, when the effects of perceptual salience on 
visual attention should be most pronounced. We did however find that participants spent 
significantly more time fixating in the NVAOI for the “novice-like” and “equal” salience 
manipulations, and the raw percentage of time spent fixating in the NVAOI was also greater for 
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the “expert-like” salience manipulations. This indicates that participants attended to the novice-
like area more than the expert-like area in these physics problems, regardless of relative 
perceptual salience. This is evidence that what participants’ were thinking about, not the relative 
perceptual salience of the diagram features, primarily influenced their visual attention. 
To further investigate how perceptual salience influenced participants eye movements, 
we used a scan path analysis which takes into account both spatial and temporal aspects of the 
eye movements. We calculated similarity scores (ScanMatch scores) between participants’ scan 
paths and predicted scan paths for both the expert-like and novice-like salience manipulations. 
We found that participants’ scan paths were more similar to either the predicted scan path 
produced from the expert-like salience manipulation or the novice-like salience manipulation. 
This means that despite of the salience manipulation, participants’ scan-paths were more similar 
to the one predicted scan path. This indicates that the salience manipulation of the problem 
diagrams was not influencing participants’ eye movements.  
We also looked at how closely participants attended to the perceptually salient diagram 
elements may have predicted the correctness of their answer. It may be that a high similarity 
score between participants’ eye movements and the predicted scan path for the expert salience 
manipulation would result in a high probability of answering correctly, because, in line with 
Heckler’s conjecture, participants’ attention was initially caught by salient and plausible 
elements which were then used to reason to an answer. If instead participants viewed the novice-
like salience manipulation, they would have a high similarity score between their eye movements 
and the predicted scan path for this manipulation and have a high probability of answering 
incorrectly. We did not find this to be the case. The ScanMatch score for the congruent 
comparisons did not predict correctness for either the novice-like or expert salience 
manipulations. This evidence is contrary to Heckler’s conjecture.  
Since we did not find evidence of perceptual salience influencing eye movements and 
answer choices, we sought to determine if top-down factors may have influenced visual attention 
on these study problems. If the way the participants utilize the domain knowledge they possess to 
reason and answer these physics problems influences where they look in the problem diagram, 
we expect a difference in the percentage of time spent looking in the expert-like and novice-like 
AOIs depending on correctness of answer. This is because participants who answered the 
problem correctly likely have applied their domain knowledge in a scientifically correct way 
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while those who answered the problem incorrectly did not. It was the way these participants 
reasoned to their answer (whether correct or not) that influenced their eye movements. We 
compared the percentage of time spent looking in the novice and expert-like areas of interest for 
both the novice-like and expert-like salience manipulations between those who answered 
correctly and incorrectly for the full problem period. Despite the fact that the perceptual salience 
of important diagram elements was manipulated, we found that on problems with a fairly even 
distribution of correct and incorrect answers, regardless of the salience manipulation, participants 
who answered the problem correctly spent a significantly higher percentage of time in the 
EXAOI on five out of eight problems and those who answered incorrectly spent a significantly 
or nearly significantly greater percentage of time in the NVAOI on five of eight problems.  
Overall we find no evidence to support Heckler’s conjecture that when initially viewing a 
physics problem, salient elements in the problem diagram capture the learner’s attention via 
automatic bottom-up perceptual processes. If these salient areas are relevant to the problem 
solution and plausible, students activate certain reasoning resources based on these elements and 
answer accordingly. We have no evidence that our perceptually salient elements (due to 
manipulations of luminance contrast) captured visual attention or influenced students’ answer 
choices. On the contrary, we did find evidence that it is what the participants are thinking about 
that influenced where they looked and it follows that these cognitive processes also influenced 
their answers.  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
 Overview of Work 
The purpose of this work was to investigate and influence visual attention in physics 
problem solving. We looked at how top-down and bottom-up perceptual processes influenced 
visual attention in physics problems with a diagram that contained relevant and novice-like 
elements. We also investigated the possibility of using dynamic visual cues to influence problem 
solvers visual attention, reasoning and answer choices on these physics problems. We used an 
eye tracker to record eye movements of participants and used these as a primary data source. 
 Research Questions Answered 
 Research Question 1 
In our first study we investigated differences in visual attention between those who 
correctly and incorrectly answer physics problems with relevant information in a diagram. In 
addition, we looked for evidence of top-down cognitive and bottom-up perceptual processes 
influencing visual attention for correct and incorrect solvers. We had two hypotheses about how 
visual attention would differ between these groups. First, we hypothesized that those with 
adequate domain knowledge to correctly answer a problem would spend more time fixating on 
thematically relevant areas of a diagram that provide the solution to the problem. Conversely, 
those who answer the problem incorrectly would spend more time fixating elsewhere in the 
diagram.  More specifically, we hypothesized that those answering the problem incorrectly 
would spend more time fixating on areas of the diagram consistent with a novice-like 
misconception. These participants would initially attend to perceptually salient areas of the 
diagram, but would quickly disengage their attention from these areas and instead attend to 
novice-like areas. Such effects would suggest a strong role for top-down factors in guiding 
attention while solving physics problems involving diagrams. Alternatively, our second 
hypothesis was that those who answer incorrectly are more likely to be influenced by 
perceptually salient diagram elements than those who have adequate domain knowledge, as it has 
been shown that perceptual salience has a larger influence on novice learners’ eye movements.  
Such effects would suggest a strong role for bottom-up factors in guiding attention during 
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physics problem solving with diagrams. We found that those who answered the problems 
correctly spent more time fixating on thematically relevant areas on five of six problems 
analyzed and those who answered incorrectly spent more time fixating on novice-like areas on 
five of six problems analyzed for the full problem period. We found differences in time spent 
fixating on the perceptually salient areas on two of the six problems analyzed for the full 
problem period, though in these problems the perceptually salient area either partially or 
completely overlapped with the novice-like area. These findings align more closely with our first 
hypothesis, suggesting that top-down cognitive processes are dominant in physics problem 
solving and incorrect solvers are guided by incorrect knowledge, not perceptual salience. We 
expected to find the strongest effect of bottom-up perceptual processes in the first two seconds of 
viewing, so we compared the time spent in the thematically relevant, novice-like and 
perceptually salient areas in this time period. We found no differences based on correctness. We 
did notice that the raw percentage of time spent looking in the perceptually salient AOI is higher 
for incorrect solvers than correct problem solvers on five of the six problems, though not 
statistically significantly so.  Thus, it is possible that a larger study with more observations might 
show this effect to be statistically significant. To further investigate the effect of perceptual 
salience on attention both spatially and temporally, we conducted a scan path analysis comparing 
how similar correct solvers scan paths were to one another (C-C), how similar incorrect solvers 
scan paths were to one another (I-I) and how similar correct solvers scan paths were to incorrect 
solvers scan paths (C-I). Higher similarity scores on I-I comparisons than the C-C comparisons 
would suggest dominance of bottom-up processes, as those being led by perceptual salience are 
predicted to look at the same diagram elements in the same order. We did not find significant 
differences in ScanMatch scores between those in the C-C comparisons and those in the I-I 
comparisons on five of the six problems analyzed in this study. This evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the attention of incorrect solvers is primarily directed by top-down naïve 
theories, inappropriately used conceptual resources or categorization into incorrect ontological 
categories and not the relative perceptual salience of the elements. This finding aligns well with 
our previous findings that showed no significant difference in the percentage of fixation time in 
the perceptually salient areas of the diagram during the full problem period, or the first two 
seconds of viewing the diagram, when the effects of perceptual salience should be most 
pronounced. It also aligns well with the findings showing significant differences in the 
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percentage of time incorrect solvers spent in the novice-like areas of the diagram and the 
percentage of time correct solvers spent in the thematically-relevant areas of the diagram. So 
overall, we find support for the hypothesis that top-down cognitive processes primarily drive 
visual attention and correct and incorrect solvers on physics problems. 
 Research Question 2 
In our second study we wanted to know if short duration dynamic selection/integration 
visual cues influenced students’ reasoning and the way they answer physics questions with a 
diagram. We find some evidence these cues improve students’ problem solving performance on 
conceptual physics problems, as participants were able to correctly answer and reason about 
problems they were previously unable to.  Of the four problem sets used, we found that 
significantly more students changed to a correct answer after seeing the visual cues on the roller 
coaster problem. We did not find this difference on the other three problem sets.  
We also investigated how the dynamic visual cues influenced participants’ eye 
movements while viewing the cues. We looked for relationships between how well each 
participant followed the visual cues with their eyes and whether they changed from an incorrect 
answer on the initial problem to a correct answer and reasoning on a similar problem. We found 
that for the roller coaster problem, those who successfully answered and reasoned about a similar 
problem had higher similarity scores. This suggests a link between how well participants 
attended to the visual cues and how helpful the cue was at implicitly influencing their reasoning 
about the problem. We did not find the same difference on the other three problems. One would 
expect that if the cues were ineffective at helping students answer a similar problem correctly we 
would not find a relationship between the effectiveness of the cue and how well the students 
followed it with their eyes. 
We wanted to know if after seeing visual cues repeated on several similar problems, 
students could then successfully answer and reason about related but different problems with no 
cues. We compared the correctness of answers and reasoning on the transfer problem associated 
with each of the four problem sets between those who had seen visual cues and those who had 
not. We found a greater number of participants in the cued condition answering the ball problem 
correctly. We also found the raw percentages of correct answers were greater for those in the 
cued condition on all four problem sets. Thus, we find some evidence that repeatedly showing 
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novices visual cues on related problems may help them form a productive mental representation 
on similar future problems viewed without cues.  
We also investigated how seeing the dynamic visual cues on similar problems may have 
influenced participants’ visual attention on the transfer problems. We compared the percentage 
of fixation time spent in “novice-like” and “expert-like” areas of interest between those in the 
cued and non-cued conditions on the transfer problems. We found that on the roller coaster 
problem, participants in the cued condition spent a significantly greater percentage of time 
looking in the “expert-like” AOI and a significantly smaller percentage of time in the “novice-
like” AOI. We also found for the ball and skier problems, those in the cued condition spent a 
significantly smaller percentage of fixation time looking in the “novice-like” AOI. This suggests 
that seeing the cues on this problem has an influence on participants’ visual attention on 
subsequent un-cued problems and helps them to pay more attention to the expert-like elements 
(in one case) and less attention to the novice-like elements (in three of the four problem sets 
used). This is promising, as we know from previous work that those who answer a problem 
correctly spend more time looking at the “expert-like” areas of the problem and those who 
answer incorrectly spend more time looking at the “novice-like” areas. Helping participants to 
look at helpful areas and ignore distracting areas when no visual cues are present is likely a first 
step to helping them reason correctly about the problem.  
 Research Question 3 
In our third study, we looked at how perceptual salience of diagram elements influenced 
students’ answer choices and eye movements on physics problems with the relevant information 
in a diagram. Overall we find no evidence to support Heckler’s (2011) conjecture that when 
initially viewing a physics problem, salient elements in the problem diagram capture the 
learner’s attention via automatic bottom-up perceptual processes. If these salient areas are 
relevant to the problem solution and plausible, students activate certain reasoning resources 
based on these elements and answer accordingly. We found no evidence that our perceptually 
salient elements (due to changes in luminance contrast) captured visual attention or influenced 
students’ answer choices. On the contrary, we found evidence that it is what the participants are 
thinking about that influenced where they looked and it follows that these cognitive processes 
also influenced their answers.  
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Specifically, we found that manipulation of perceptual salience via luminance contrast of 
expert and novice elements in a physics problem diagram did not influence the correctness of 
students’ answers and we factored in previous semester physics test grades, we still found no 
effect of this type of salience manipulation on correctness of answer.  We also did not find an 
effect of our salience manipulation on the percentage of fixation time divided by percentage of 
area (PT/PA) for either the expert or novice AOIs. This indicates that attention was not drawn to 
perceptually salient portions (according to the Saliency Toolbox) of the diagram in the first two 
seconds of viewing. We did however find that participants spent significantly more time fixating 
in the NVAOI for the “novice-like” and “equal” salience manipulations, and the raw percentage 
of time spent fixating in the NVAOI was also greater for the “expert-like” salience 
manipulations. This indicates that participants attended to the novice-like area more than the 
expert-like area in these physics problems, regardless of relative perceptual salience. We 
calculated similarity scores (ScanMatch scores) between participants’ scan paths and model scan 
paths for both the expert-like and novice-like salience manipulations. We found that participants’ 
scan paths were more similar to either the model scan path produced from the expert-like 
salience manipulation or the novice-like salience manipulation. This means that despite of the 
salience manipulation, participants’ scan-paths were more similar to the one model scan path. 
This indicates that the salience manipulation of the problem diagrams was not influencing eye 
movements. We looked at how closely participants attended to the perceptually salient diagram 
elements may have predicted the correctness of their answer. The similarity (ScanMatch) score 
for the congruent comparisons did not predict correctness for either the novice-like or expert 
salience manipulations.  
Since we did not find evidence of perceptual salience influencing eye movements and 
answer choices, we sought to determine if top-down factors may have influenced visual attention 
on these study problems. We compared the percentage of time spent looking in the novice and 
expert-like areas of interest for both the novice-like and expert-like salience manipulations 
between those who answered correctly and incorrectly for the full problem period. Despite the 
fact that the perceptual salience of important diagram elements was varied, we found that on 
problems with a fairly even distribution of correct and incorrect answers, those who answered 
correctly spent a significantly higher percentage of time in the EXAOI on five out of eight 
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problems and those who answered incorrectly spent a significantly or nearly significantly greater 
percentage of time in the NVAOI on five of eight problems.  
 Limitations and Future Work 
In this section we will synthesize some of the limitations and related changes that should 
be made in future work. We will also suggest additional broader directions the work could take.  
With regard to differences in visual attention based on correctness of answer, we found 
differences in the time spent in the areas of interest for the problems studied in Chapters 3 and 5, 
though these problems only represented a limited number of introductory physics problems, 
primarily dealing with kinematics graphs and conservation of energy. To increase the 
generalizability of our conclusions, these studies should be repeated with more problems from 
other areas of introductory physics to determine if these differences in visual attention occur in 
many contexts or are specific to those contexts studied. It would also be important to include 
students having a wider range of prior knowledge of physics. We looked at visual attention of 
introductory physics students, primarily from algebra based courses and a handful of graduate 
students. Intermediate and advanced undergraduate students as well as physics professors could 
be included in future studies to observe a possible continuum on how visual attention changes 
with experience and level of domain knowledge. Additionally, the studies could be improved by 
using a larger number of participants, which would increase the statistical power and enable us to 
more thoroughly test the perceptual saliency hypothesis.   Further, there were several problems 
described in Chapter 5 where the pattern of differences between correct and incorrect solvers was 
not observed. Since the areas of interest for these problems were not defined using data from 
student interviews, it may that conducting interviews and then redefining areas of interest would 
produce the pattern of differences, or that differences based on correctness only exist on certain 
problems. This should be investigated in future work. 
In the studies in Chapter 3 and 5, the conclusions we have drawn about the influence of 
perceptual salience on visual attention must remain tentative as in each study we only used one 
computational model of visual salience, the Saliency Toolbox which implemented Itti’s 
algorithm (1998). It would be important in future studies to utilize and compare other definitions 
for perceptual salience to determine if perceptual salience as predicted by a different algorithm 
influences eye movements and answer choices. Further, in the study described in Chapter 5, we 
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only manipulated the luminance contrast of the images, but we found that this manipulation did 
not influence bottom-up attention. High perceptual salience can also be achieved through 
relatively greater contrast in terms of color, intensity, motion etc. compared to the other 
elements, though these were not investigated in this study. In the future, it would be informative 
to vary other dimensions of perceptual salience as well as combinations of these and look for 
influences on eye movements and answer choices. Perhaps manipulations of other dimensions of 
salience would capture attention on these problems more effectively. Further, the diagrams used 
in both studies were simple black and white line drawings. We might observe a stronger effect of 
bottom-up processes if we had used more complicated diagrams, for example, color photos of 
real world scenarios. In future work, diagram types in addition to simple black and white figures 
should be investigated. Finally, if future work showed that the problem solving process had an 
underlying perceptual component, we would need to explore interventions that would need to 
help student’s change how they look at a problem by ignoring salient elements and focusing 
instead on thematically-relevant elements.  
The work described in Chapter 5 could also be improved. In our study design, we chose 
to collect written responses from participants for each problem, but did not collect explanations 
of reasoning for these answer choices. While this minimized interaction among the interviewer 
and participant and accompanying verbal or non-verbal cues that may have influenced 
participants’ answers and reasoning, we do not know why the participants gave the answers they 
did. Thus, there is a chance that we have included false positives in our data. This be addressed 
in future work, for example, by collecting verbal explanations from participants using careful 
interviewing techniques or having participants write out an explanation along with their answer. 
The studies reported in Chapter 3 and 5 suggest that top-down cognitive processes 
dominate in physics problem solving. We found differences in the way participants’ viewed 
different areas of the diagram based on the correctness of their answer. This finding is evidence 
for the domain knowledge students’ possess and use strongly influencing eye movements, 
though we cannot rule out the influence of the problem solving task itself on visual attention. 
Previous research has found that participants look at perceptually salient areas when free viewing 
a scene, but when a search task is introduced, the influence of perceptually salience on eye 
movements is no longer seen (Underwood et al., 2006). So we might find no influence of 
perceptual salience in our study because physics problem solving in inherently a directed task or 
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because participants use their prior knowledge to direct their attention or a combination of both. 
We do not have evidence to disentangle these possible effects so we can make no conclusions 
regarding the precise mechanism of top-down influence on attention. 
With regard to the visual cueing work described in Chapter 4, we find some evidence that 
visual cues overlaid on static problems can help a student answer similar problems correctly, a 
transfer problem correctly, and can even influence visual attention on the transfer problem so 
that participants spend more time looking at relevant areas and ignoring irrelevant areas. But, we 
find this to be true only for some of the problem sets used in this study. We then ask ourselves, 
why we did not see the same positive results on the other problem sets? Our answers to this 
question motivate our future work. 
First we speculate on why the cues on the roller coaster problem were effective at helping 
students answer the similar problems correctly, but not the cues on the ball, skier, or graph 
problems. Upon examining the cues, we notice that the roller coaster cues were especially 
simple. The simple back and forth motion highlighting the roller coaster carts were repeated 
several times. On the other hand, the visual cues used in the ball, skier, and graph problems 
moved in a more complex pattern. For example, in the ball problem, the cue moved between 
balls in track A at a given time period, then moved between balls on track B at the same time 
period, and were then repeated with a different set of balls. This pattern was only shown once for 
six seconds and it is likely that the pattern was simply too complicated to draw significant 
meaning from it in such a short time. Simpler cues should be used in future work and the time 
the cue is shown should be varied. Also, the cue onset occurred four seconds after a similar 
problem was shown. It may be that students needed more time to familiarize themselves with the 
problem before they could concentrate on and draw meaning from the cues. Thus, the cue onset 
time should also be varied in future work. We designed the cues to mimic the patterns that 
correct solvers used when viewing the problem diagrams. When helping someone who does not 
know how to solve a problem, showing them what an “expert” does may not be helpful, as an 
expert’s problem solving process is likely streamlined and condensed. There are also many types 
of visual cues that could be applied to a given problem, and we only tried one type, namely 
flashing colored shapes that helped the participants select and integrate important diagram 
elements. In future versions of this study, we plan to use very simple cues that are easily encoded 
and understood by students. To ensure that the cues are “student friendly” we plan to first test 
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various versions of visual cues on a given problem with a large number of introductory physics 
students in individual interviews. During these interviews, we will observe the problem solving 
process of an introductory student (as opposed to an “expert”) and will offer different types of 
cues starting with the most implicit moving to the most explicit. For example, on the roller 
coaster problem, we could start by highlighting the carts and dimming the tracks, then we could 
try highlighting the carts in a temporal order (as we did in this study). Were this unhelpful, we 
could add even more information to the problem by overlaying lines under each cart representing 
the vertical height of each cart. Trying many variations of cues on a large number of students 
will allow us to gather much information about how the students’ perceive the visual cues. We 
can then tweak the cues accordingly and try them with a new set of students. In this process we 
can note the individual qualities of the students to extract patterns as to whom the cues help and 
specifically how they are helpful. Additionally, there may be an interaction between the 
individual attributes of a student and the types of cues that are effective on certain problems. 
With this information, we hope to establish a broad framework for effective visual cues that 
takes into account features of the student, the cues and the type of problem. This framework 
would be developed iteratively testing the framework with new sets of problems and students 
and once again use eye tracking to measure how these cues influence visual attention.   
Additionally, there may only be certain types of problems that lend themselves to 
improvement through visual cueing.  We have only explored four problems in this study.  There 
are a plethora of problems to be tested in future studies.  It could also be that the order in which 
the problems are presented influences the usefulness of the cue.  The roller coaster problem was 
presented first each time and was the only problem the cues were found to influence.  In future 
studies, the order of cue problems will be randomized to balance out any order effects.  
In this study, we did not tell students what the cues were for, similar to Thomas and 
Lleras’ (2007) work. We hoped that the cues would implicitly influence students to re-represent 
a problem and overcome an impasse. While we did find evidence that the cues were helpful on 
the roller coaster problem, they were not helpful on the other three problem tests. We informally 
asked a subset of participants what they thought of the visual cues and found that students’ ideas 
about the cues showed a lot of variation. It may be that students’ impressions of the cues 
influenced how useful the cues were at helping the students. In the future, we plan to tell students 
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that the cues are helpful and we predict that students will benefit more from the cues when they 
know their purpose.  
Further, in this study we found a difference in the similarity scores (ScanMatch) between 
those who did answer a similar problem correctly and those who didn’t. This means that that 
there was a difference in how well the participants followed the cues with their eyes and this 
difference was related to their success on the similar problems. We predict that participants will 
follow the cues more closely and purposefully if they know they are helpful (as opposed to just 
being random flashing shapes), and they will get more from the cues since they are actually 
looking at them and will in turn answer more similar problems correctly.  
We also found differences between the cue and no cue groups on only one of the four 
transfer problems tested. It may be that the three transfer problems that showed no difference 
were too difficult for this level of student, as very few students in either group answered these 
problems correctly.  It is also possible that the researchers viewed the transfer problems as 
closely related to the similar problems, though the students did not view them this way, and thus 
were unable to apply what they gained from the cues to the transfer problems. In future studies, 
we will first test our transfer problems with students in individual or group interviews to gain 
insight into how the students view the transfer problems and the connections they see between 
the similar and transfer problems. 
In conclusion, there is much work to be done to understand the factors that lead to helpful 
cues.  This study offers hope that cueing can potentially serve as effective conceptual scaffolding 
for novice physics students, but much work is necessary to perfect this method. 
 Anticipated Broader Impacts 
The work on visual cueing described above offers hope that cueing can serve as effective 
conceptual scaffolding for physics students, but much work is necessary to understand and 
perfect this method. Once guidelines for successful cues on physics problems have been 
determined, there is tremendous opportunity to use cues in physics learning. For example, online 
homework environments are commonly used at both the secondary and university level. When 
students are working individually on homework problems with an associated diagram, visual 
cues could be overlaid and act as implicit hints to guide problem solving. Visual cues could be 
provided on a set of similar problems, much like in our study, and this would hopefully lead to 
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students performing better on un-cued related problems. Further, eye-tracking technology is 
rapidly advancing and eye trackers using the camera on a computer, tablet or smart phone are 
now available (Bulling & Gellersen, 2010; Chynał & Sobecki, 2010; Holland & Komogortsev, 
2012). As this technology becomes more popular and accessible, gaze contingent cueing 
schemes can be used. This means that depending on where a participant looks, customized visual 
cues would appear as hints. For example, if a student spends a certain amount of time fixating in 
a novice-like area in a diagram, a cue would appear that redirects their attention to a relevant 
area. If another student is looking at one piece of a relevant area, a visual cue can appear that 
models a productive way to integrate the information in several relevant areas.  
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Appendix A - Study Problems From Chapter 3 
Figure A.1 Problems used in studies 1-3 from Chapter 3. 
Problem 1 used in studies 1-3. 
 
Problem 2 used in studies 1-3. 
 
Problem 3 used in studies 1-3. 
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Problem 4 used in studies 1-3. 
 
Problem 7 used in studies 1-3.  
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Problem 10 used in studies 1-3. 
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Appendix B - Cue Patterns from Chapter 4 
Figure B.1 Problems used in study with visual cues overlaid. The colored shapes in each 
problem are the visual cues and the numbers in italics show sequence of animated cues (the 
numbers were not seen by study participants). From top to bottom: roller coaster problem, 
ball problem, skier problem, graph problem. 
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Appendix C - Additional Material from Chapter 5 
Table C.1 All problems used in study described in Chapter 5 shown with “expert-like” and “novice-like” areas most 
perceptually salient as well as both areas having equal levels of perceptual salience. 
 
Problem 
Designation 
Expert-Like Salience Manipulation Novice-like Salience Manipulation Equal Salience Manipulation 
A 
   
 
B 
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C 
   
D 
   
E 
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F 
   
G 
   
H 
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I 
   
J 
   
K 
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L 
   
M 
   
N 
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O 
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Table C.2 Problem statements used in this study as well as definitions of “novice-like” and 
“expert-like” area. 
Problem Statement Problem Label Novice-like Area Expert-like Area 
The motion of two objects is represented in 
the graph. When are the objects moving 
with the same speed? 
A Point where lines cross on graph. 
Point where lines 
have same slope. 
When is the speed of the object shown in the 
graph zero? B 
Point where line 
crosses x-axis. 
Point where slope 
of line is zero.  
How does the final speed of cart A compare 
to the final speed of cart B, if the mass of 
the carts is the same and they both start at 
rest? (Frictional effects can be ignored) 
C Roller coaster track (shape of track) 
Roller coaster 
carts (height of 
carts) 
Rank the changes in potential energy during 
the skiers descent down each slope from 
greatest to least. 
D Shape of each slope Height of each slope 
Sally slides down a straight slide and Carl 
slides down a curved slide. If Sally and Carl 
start at rest at the top of their respective 
slides, how do their speeds compare at the 
bottom of the slides? (Sally and Carl weigh 
the same amount) 
E Shape of slides Height of slides 
Between which pair of parallel plates is the 
electric field greater? F 
Potential at point 
between plates 
Difference in 
potential on plates 
Which pendulum takes longer to swing back 
and forth once? G Mass Length 
Blocks made of the same material are placed 
on opposites sides of the see-saw. Which 
was will the see-saw tip? 
H Only attending to mass 
Attending to mass 
and lever arm 
Which block has a larger acceleration when 
the hit? I Speed of blocks Mass of blocks 
At which point on the graph is the object 
turning around (moving away and then 
coming back) 
J 
Point where slope 
changes from 
increasing to 
decreasing  
Point where line 
crosses x-axis 
Two balls roll along the path show. The 
position of the balls is shown at equal time 
intervals of one second. When does Ball B 
have the same speed as Ball A? 
K Time when balls are at same position  
Interval where 
balls have rolled 
same distance in 
one second. 
The motion of a car is represented in the 
graph. At what time is the car moving 
faster?  
L 
Point with larger 
distance value 
(higher on the y-
axis) 
Point when slope 
of line is greater 
Which trajectory (path) has a longer time of 
flight? M Wider trajectory Taller trajectory 
The graph represents two tanks being filled 
by water over time by separate water hoses. 
Which tank is filling faster at the time 
indicated on the graph? 
N 
Line with greater 
value on the y-axis 
at the indicated point 
Line with greater 
slope at the point 
indicated 
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If both balls have the same mass and same 
initial speed, which ball arrives at the final 
position first? Friction can be ignored.  
O Shape of the track 
Relative height at 
initial and final 
position of balls 
 
 
 
